Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics by Wang, Sining
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School
6-22-2016
Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental
Economics
Sining Wang
sining.wang@uconn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Wang, Sining, "Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics" (2016). Doctoral Dissertations. 1235.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1235
Three Essays on Behavioral and Experimental Economics 
 
Sining Wang, PhD. 
University of Connecticut, 2016 
 
Abstract 
The focus of this dissertation is to understand how mental rules of thumb, cognitive biases, 
and individual differences can lead judgments and decisions to systematically deviate from the 
theoretical “optimal” choices. The first essay examines how a decision-maker’s subjective belief is 
determined by her risk preference in a coordination game. We conduct a laboratory experiment 
where the participants played a repeated, fixed-partner stag-hunt game. In the experiment, we 
elicited the participants’ subjective belief, risk aversion and cautiousness levels. Here, we confirm the 
findings from past studies that suggest that the traditional measure of risk aversion in economics 
cannot explain people’s behavior. Additionally, we find that the psychological concept of 
cautiousness plays a key role in determining the origin and the evolution of the decision-maker’s 
belief. Specifically, we find that cautiousness affects the way people form the mental representation 
of their partners. A decision-maker with a higher cautiousness level is less likely to believe that her 
partner will choose the risky option. When the stag-hunt game was played repeatedly, a high 
cautiousness level prevents the decision-maker from updating her belief effectively, and 
consequently impedes cooperation between the players. The second essay proposes and 
experimentally tests the hypothesis that cognitive dissonance associated with the context plays a key 
role in determining people’s decisions in economic experiments. We conduct a laboratory bribery 
game experiment where the cognitive dissonance levels are controlled using different treatments 
(familiar-context treatment, unfamiliar-context treatment, and context-free treatment). With the aid 
of an independent attitude survey, we find that people in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the 
context-free treatment experience the same cognitive dissonance level; meanwhile, we do not 
observe different behavior in the lab. We also find the familiar-context treatment triggers the most 
intensive cognitive dissonance level among all treatments where the subjects are much less likely to 
behave unethically. Our theory is able to unify the mixed results from past studies on the 
experimental context effects. In the third essay, using a unique data set from a sample of recent local 
college graduates in China, we investigate the effect of agreeableness on the respondents’ starting 
salary and perceived career satisfaction level. Results from our analyses indicates that agreeableness 
positively predict women’s starting salary. This effect is highly robust to change in model 
specifications. However, agreeableness does not impact the men’s starting salary. Our result here 
suggests that non-cognitive ability (such as personality traits) plays a vital role in determining labor 
market outcome. In addition, we find that agreeableness positively related with subjective job-
satisfaction level. But this result is not robust to changes in model specifications. When we add the 
respondents’ major as a control variable, the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes 
negligible and not statistically significant. This result might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing 
major. Further examination is required to explore this possibility. 
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Overview of the Dissertation
    Most modern economic theories were conceived as normative models of an idealized “rational” 
decision maker, not as a description of the behavior of real humans. However, accumulating evidence 
suggests that some of the most basic rules of economic theories are commonly violated. The deviations 
of actual behavior from the normative models are “too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to 
be dismissed as random error and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the normative 
system” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). The focus of my dissertation is to understand how mental 
rules of thumb, cognitive biases, and individual differences can lead judgments and decisions to 
systematically deviate from the theoretical “optimal” choices. 
    The Role of Risk Aversion and Cautiousness in Belief Formation is the first chapter of my dissertation. 
In this paper I investigate belief formation and decision-making in a coordination game. Past studies 
on coordination game have looked at how institutional changes impact the outcomes of the games, but 
have ignored the importance of subjective belief and the role of individual characteristics. In this study, 
I argue that to fully understand the decision-making mechanism, it is essential to investigate how 
individual differences in risk preference influence the decision-maker’s subjective beliefs. Specifically, 
I demonstrate that in a coordination game, a decision-maker’s subjective belief is determined by her 
risk preference. I conducted a laboratory experiment where the participants played a repeated, fixed-
partner stag-hunt game. In the experiment, I elicited the participants’ subjective belief, risk aversion 
and cautiousness level. While the traditional measure of risk aversion in economics cannot explain 
people’s behavior just as past studies suggested, I find that the psychological concept of cautiousness 
plays a key role in determining the origin and the evolution of the decision-maker’s belief. More precisely, 
I find that cautiousness affects the way people form the mental representation of their partners. A 
decision-maker with higher cautiousness level is less likely to believe that her partner will choose the 
risky option. When the stag-hunt game was played repeatedly, high cautiousness level prevents the 
decision-maker from updating her belief effectively, and consequently impedes cooperation between 
the players.
    In the second chapter of my dissertation titled A Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation of the Context 
Effect in Economic Experiments: Evidence from a Laboratory Bribery Game, I aim to make contributions 
on experimental methodology. Specifically, this paper examines how experimental context affects 
people’s decision using the paradigm of a bribery game. Cognitive dissonance level evoked by engaging 
in dishonest practices was manipulated by different experimental instructions. More precisely, the 
same experimental task was presented to the student subjects with three different instructions: one 
with familiar-context instruction, one with unfamiliar-context instruction, and the other with context-
free instruction. In line with past studies, I do not find essential different outcomes in the unfamiliar-
context treatment and the context-free treatment.   In contrast, I find that the student subjects are much 
less likely to engage in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment. In addition, students who 
engaged in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment required more monetary compensation 
to justify for their decisions. Integrate results obtained from a separate attitude survey, I propose that 
the familiar experimental context amplifies the cognitive dissonance of engaging in dishonest practices, 
prevents them from behaving unethically.
    The Premium for being a Nice Person: Agreeableness and Career Success Level in the Initial Career 
Stage constitutes the third chapter of my dissertation. In this paper, I apply the insights gathered 
from the laboratory experiments and the psychology literatures to investigate important issues in 
labor economics. Using a unique data set from a sample of recent local college graduates in China, 
we investigate the effect of agreeableness on the respondents’ starting salary and perceived career 
satisfaction level. Results from our analyses indicates that agreeableness positively predict women’s 
starting salary. This effect is highly robust to change in model specifications. However, agreeableness 
does not impact the men’s starting salary. Our result here suggests that non-cognitive ability (such as 
personality traits) plays a vital role in determining labor market outcome. In addition, we find that 
agreeableness positively related with subjective job-satisfaction level. But this result is not robust to 
changes in model specifications. When we add the respondents’ major as a control variable, the effect 
of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes negligible and not statistically significant. This result 
might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing major. Further examination is required to explore this 
possibility.
Essay 1
The Role of Risk Aversion and Cautiousness in Belief Formation
1. Introduction
    In a variety of social environments, people must decide whether to engage in mutually beneficial but 
risky cooperation with others. Cooperation is risky if it leads to losses when not reciprocated. Many 
authors have examined how the structure of payoffs and subjects’ risk aversion impact decisions in 
these environments (Cooper et al.,1990; Van Huyck et al., 1990; Russell et al, 1992; Carlsson and Van 
Damme, 1993; Harsanyi, 1995; Selten, 1995; Straub, 1995; Battalio et al.,2001; Schmidt et al.,2003; 
Chaudhuri et al., 2010; Roos and Nau, 2010). However, the origin and evolution of beliefs about others’ 
behavior has received much less attention. In this study, we experimentally examine whether the 
economic concept of risk aversion or the related psychological construct of cautiousness, a personality 
trait, can explain a decision-maker’s subjective beliefs about her partner’s action in a repeated stag-
hunt game.
    Consider the game in Figure 1 in which players independently decide between Red and Blue. The 
game has two pure-strategy equilibria: a payoff-dominant equilibrium [Red, Red] and a risk-dominant 
equilibrium [Blue, Blue]1.  While the payoff-dominant equilibrium is Pareto optimal, playing red is 
risky as coordination failure [Red, Blue] will result in an inferior outcome. Therefore, a player’s optimal 
strategy depends on the player’s beliefs about the likely strategy of her partner.
    As a typical case of risky cooperation, the stag-hunt game has attracted a lot of attention in the 
last two decades. Cooper et al. (1990) showed that variations in a player’s payoff from an opponent’s 
play of a cooperative strategy influences equilibrium selection. Battalio et al. (2001)  and Dubois et 
al. (2011) showed that in repeated stag-hunt games, the increase in the expected earning difference 
between the two strategies made the subjects pay more attention to results from previous periods. 
Consequently their strategy selections converged to the equilibrium outcomes more rapidly. Schmidt 
et al. (2003) showed that changes in risk-dominant equilibrium payoffs are more likely to influence 
behavior than changes in payoff-dominant equilibrium payoffs. Chaudhuri et al. (2010) showed that 
a recommendation to play the payoff-dominant equilibrium is successful in resolving coordination 
failure. These studies examine how institutional changes impact outcomes in games, yet none provide 
an explicit decision-making mechanism. Yet, the findings from these studies suggest the importance of 
	 These	equilibrium	notions	are	defined	by	Harsanyi	and	Selten	(988).
examining belief formation and coordination. For example, Chaudhuri et al. (2010)’s study shows that 
manipulating beliefs changes outcomes, while results in Battalio et al. (2001), Yoshida et al. (2010), 
and Dubois et al. (2011) imply that the evolution of the subjective beliefs affect people’s behavior.
    Recent experimental studies have also investigated the relationship between risk preference and 
strategy selection in stag-hunt games (Neumann and Vogt, 2009; Buyukboyaci, 2012; Al-Ubaydli et 
al., 2013). To our knowledge, only null findings have been returned, finding (perhaps paradoxically) 
little relationship between risk aversion and behavior. However, the calculation of an optimal strategy 
entails not only risk but also beliefs (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Rey-Biel, 2009). These past studies use 
various proxies for beliefs, such as the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or the proportion of people 
selecting a particular strategy.
    We propose that the decision-maker’s subjective belief concerning the other player’s action is the 
key to understanding the decision-making mechanism in these contexts. The subjective belief should 
be understood as the outcome of one’s heuristics and reasoning, and therefore potentially widely 
heterogeneous. In order to reveal how people make decisions, we directly elicit subjective beliefs and 
investigate where these beliefs come from. 
    While past studies focus exclusively on the economic concept of risk aversion to measure risk 
preference, we introduce the psychological construct of cautiousness (Moss, 1961). Wearing a seatbelt, 
skydiving, and taking social risks, are often decisions based not on carefully-calculated weighing of 
risks and rewards, but reflect an innate personality trait (Levenson, 1990; Trimpop, 1994; Lauriola 
and Levin, 2001; Weber et al., 2002; McDaniel and Zukerman, 2003; Breakwell, 2007). Both risk 
aversion and cautiousness relate to how people react to uncertainties, yet they are essentially different 
from each other in two aspects. First, whereas the estimated risk aversion reflects the change in the 
decision-maker’s gratification level toward possible gains only, the cautiousness measure assesses 
the decision-maker’s attitude toward potential negative outcome. Second, whereas the risk aversion 
measure concerns isolated individual decisions, the cautiousness measure concerns people’s thoughts 
and actions in social interaction situations. We find that cautiousness (but not risk aversion) helps 
explain subjects’ beliefs—and therefore actions—in a stag-hunt game.
1.1. The Source of Subjective Beliefs in the Coordination Game
    In the first period of a fixed-partner repeated game, the decision-maker will make her prediction 
without any information about her partner’s characteristics. Under such circumstances, how can she 
effectively “predict” what her partner will do? We propose a simple heuristic: she will first establish a 
mental representation of her partner based on her own personality traits, and then predict what the 
“imaginary partner” will do. In particular, a decision-maker who has low risk-tolerance might project 
the same characteristic on to her partner, and consequently predict that her partner is unlikely to take 
the risky action. To put it in another way, the decision-maker expects that her partner will choose the 
same strategy as she does.  In the first period of the stag-hunt game, the decision-maker’s reasoning 
would be “my partner must do the same thing as I do, otherwise she is crazy.” This type of reasoning is 
known as the “Stackelberg heuristic”. 
    The concept of “Stackelberg heuristic” was coined by Colman and Bacharach (1997). The essential idea 
of it is that “both players in a game choose strategies that maximize their own payoffs on the assumption 
that any choice will invariably met by a counter strategy that maximizes the co-player’s payoff, as if the 
co-player could choose second in a perfect information version of the game with foreknowledge of the 
first player’s choice” (Colman and Stirk, 1998). Substantial evidence have shown that the Stackelberg 
heuristic is commonly used by individuals. From the decision making literature, many past studies have 
observed the fact that people employ the Stackelberg heuristic to solve problems where the outcome 
depends on social interactions. For example, Eells (1984), Nozick and Rescher (1969), Quattrone and 
Tversky (1984), Nozick (1994), Camerer (2003), Jeffrey (2004) found that people often make decisions 
by maximizing the conditional expected value of possible acts rather than the pure expected utilities 
as in the traditional theory.  From the psychology literature, the phenomenon that people’s estimates 
of behaviors or attitudes of others are often positively related to their own behaviors or attitudes has 
been repeatedly observed and intensively investigated (see Hoch, 1987, as an example).  In short, in 
the first period of the game, risk preference directly influences the decision-maker’s subjective beliefs 
about her partner’s strategy selection. Specifically, risk-tolerance levels positively associate with the 
probability of believing one’s partner will take the risky option. Behaviorally, lower risk-tolerance level 
will lead the decision-maker more likely to select the safe option. 
    As the decision-maker plays the stag-hunt game with the same partner repeatedly, she would update 
her belief according to the results from previous periods (Erev and Roth, 1998; Neumann and Vogt, 
2009). To explore how risk preference affects the evolution of the subjective beliefs, we employ a 
particular feedback mechanism in which the strategic uncertainty can only be eliminated when the 
two players in a pair play the risky option simultaneously. Specifically, the decision-maker observes the 
payoffs she earned in each period, and then infers her partner’s action. For a decision-maker who has 
chosen Blue, her payoffs do no vary with the other person’s choice. That is to say, she can only see what 
her partner did if she has chosen Red. Feedback on the other person’s action is not available if she has 
chosen Blue . If the decision-maker were able to observe the other person’s action in any case, then one 
way to achieve the payoff-dominant equilibrium is to send my partner a signal by choosing the risky 
option. Such behavior would make the subjective beliefs irrelevant. Our feedback mechanism prevents 
signaling.   A decision-maker with lower risk-tolerance level is less likely to choose Red. Accordingly, 
she is also less likely to observe her partner’s action. Thus, the strategic uncertainty remains as long 
as one of the two players selects the safe option. If only one player has chosen Red, the coordination 
failure is still not observable to the one who has chosen Blue. Such undesired outcome creates further 
confusions between the two players, prevents them from achieving the payoff-dominant equilibrium.
    In summary, we put forward that risk preference plays a central role on explaining the origin and 
the evolution of the decision-maker’s subjective belief. In the first period of the game, risk preference 
affects the way people form the mental representation of their partners; consequently, risk-tolerance 
level positively correlate with the probability that believing one’s partner will choose the risky 
option. When the decision-maker plays the stag-hunt game with the same partner repeatedly, low 
risk-tolerance level would hinder the elimination of strategic uncertainty, which in turn, impeding 
cooperation between the players.
1.2. The Operational Definition of Risk Preference
    Economists generally conceive of risk preference as reflecting the shape of one’s utility function. 
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) introduced the concept of risk aversion as a quantitative measure 
for individual risk preference. Based on this idea, economists typically use lottery games to elicit the 
decision-maker’s risk aversion level in laboratory experiments. For instance, Eckel and Grossman 
(2008) introduced a lottery game that contains a series of lotteries, each lottery is associated with 
a particular risky level. The lotteries are given to the participants in ascending order by their risk 
levels. The participants choose one lottery among all the lotteries to play. By observing their lottery 
selections, the experimenter will then assume a particular utility function form (for example, constant 
relative/absolute risk-averse utility function) and estimate the participants’ risk aversion levels. Other 
examples include Hey and Orme (1994), Pennings and Smidts (2000), Holt and Laury (2002, 2005).
    Within the psychology literature, cautiousness, as a personality trait, is seen as an indicator of one’s 
preference toward risk. Howard A. Moss (1961) proposed “Cautiousness is regarded as the tendency 
to behave in a manner designed to avoid potential failure or disapproval experiences, and this goal is 
achieved often at the expense of other satisfactions. That is, the cautious person is more concerned 
with avoiding failure than with obtaining success. In order for cautiousness to be observed, there must 
be a basis for judging certain response alternatives as entailing less risk and less potential satisfaction 
than other alternatives”. Operationally, cautiousness is measured using personality inventories. For 
example, the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999) has a sub-dimension to assess 
people’s cautiousness level. 
    The first conceptual distinction between risk aversion and cautiousness is that they understand 
“uncertain outcome” in quite different ways: whereas risk aversion considers the uncertain outcome 
as possible utility increase, cautiousness considers the uncertain outcome as potential event that may 
lead to potential negative or disapproval experience (Knowles et al. 1973; Sitkin ans Weingart, 1995; 
Gasper and Clore, 1998). Such dissimilarity makes cautiousness a better measure for the decision-
maker’s risk preference in the stag-hunt game. In our game, the main factor that prevents people from 
choosing the cooperative action is the fear of not being reciprocated. According to the definition of 
cautiousness, a decision-maker who has a tendency to avoid potential disapproval experience will 
give away the cooperative option and choose the safe option, as the safe option entails no risk of 
coordination failure. The risk aversion measure cannot capture the decision-maker’s attitude toward 
such potential negative outcome.
    The second distinction between risk aversion and cautiousness is that they make different assumptions 
about the decision making environment: whereas risk aversion is constructed under the assumption 
that each decision-maker will make the decision on an isolated island and will not be concerned about 
other people, the cautiousness is constructed under the assumption that the decision-maker will think 
through her actions in a social interaction situation. These differences may make cautiousness a more 
apt measure of risk preference in interdependent situations. Fischer and Smith (2004) and Nicholson 
et al. (2005) found empirical evidence that cautiousness negatively correlates with the tendency of 
involving in risky social activities. To measure cautiousness, we use the average of a five item subset 
of the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), (Goldberg, 1999). Subjects indicate their agreement 
with statements (such as “I choose my words with care”) on a 5-point Likert scale. In the current study, 
we measure individual risk preference using both risk aversion and cautiousness. We employ the Eckel 
and Grossman (2008) lottery game to estimate risk aversion2.  
2. Experimental Design and Administration
    The experiment was conducted at the University of Connecticut in the fall of 2013. Participants 
were recruited from the undergraduate student population via a recruitment notice in a university-
wide “Daily Digest” email. In total, 50 undergraduates (34 women and 16 men) participated in the 
experiment over seven sessions of between six and twelve participants each. The experiment lasted 
about an hour including check-in and payment processing. Participants earned “points” through the 
experiment which were converted into cash at the conclusion of the experiment at a rate of $1 for 
every five points earned. Average earnings were $15.18, including a $5 show-up fee. 
    The experiment consisted of three parts:  (1) a ten period repeated coordination game with a fixed 
anonymous partner, (2) a survey of cautiousness, other personality factors, and demographics, and (3) 
	 Formally, we assume that the participant would have a constant relative risk aversion function as U(X)=X
(1-r)
/(1-r), where x denotes the 
expected payoffs from the lottery game. Accordingly, an extremely risk aversion participant would be characterized as  r→∞. This lottery game only 
concerns about individual’s risk aversion level, and does not incorporate a risk-seeking range. See Eckel and Grossman (2008) for more detail.
a risk-elicitation procedure. 
    Participants were randomly assigned to one of two separate rooms upon arrival. Each participant 
randomly picked an experimental ID and was paired with another participant with the same ID number 
in the other room. Participants were introduced to the coordination game represented in Figure 1 (see 
Appendix for instructions) and then interacted with the same partner for 10 periods. In each period, 
prior to making a selection, participants first made predictions about what their partners would do 
(Red or Blue), and indicated how certain they were about their predictions by selecting a number 
between 0 (not certain at all) to 100 (completely certainty). For example, a participant can indicate a 
belief that the other participant will play Red, and a 30% certainty. A participant can also indicate a 
belief as “No idea” if she has no clue about what her partner might do. We employ the binarized scoring 
rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013) algorithm to make truth-telling an optimal strategy3.  
    After making both the prediction and the selection, the experimenter informed each subject privately 
of their payoff. Since payoff does not vary with partner’s strategy when one selects the safe strategy 
(Blue), participants could infer their partner’s action only when playing the risky strategy (Red). This 
feedback mechanism rules out potential signaling behavior (i.e., if one selects the risky option in any 
period of the game, she will receive the feedback on her partner’s action in that period.  On the opposite 
side, if one selects the safe option in any period of the game, she would not know her partner’s decision 
in that period). The game was repeated for ten periods. At the end of this part, one of the ten periods 
was randomly selected by rolling a ten-sided die to determine participants’ payment for this part. The 
outcome in the randomly selected period determined how many game points the participant earned 
for his or her decision and prediction in this part.
    Next, participants completed a survey including a 30 question subset of the International Personality 
Item Pool (IPIP) (Goldberg, 1999). The 30 questions, each measured on a 5-point Likert scale, measure 
six personality traits with five questions each. The personality traits include our cautiousness 
measure, as well trust, altruism, compliance, competence, and achievement-striving, offering some 
controls for alternative motivations in risky coordination games. Additionally, the survey elicited 
demographic information, including sex, age, nationality, and education (see appendix for the complete 
questionnaire).
    Lastly, participants completed a lottery game to measure risk aversion. The lottery is an extended 
(eight option) version of the procedure designed by Eckel & Grossman (2008). Participants selected 
from among eight different binary lotteries, each with two equally possible (50%) outcomes. The 
riskiness of the eight lotteries is ascending ordered with higher expected value associated with higher 
	 See	the	experiment	instruction	in	appendix	for	more	detail.
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variance.  After selecting a lottery, one of the two outcomes was randomly selected by rolling a die with 
the outcome determining the participant’s payment for this part of the experiment. A major advantage 
of the Eckel and Grossman (2008) procedure is its simplicity, with 50/50 gambles being quite intuitive, 
and with easy-to-calculate expected values4.  
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive Statistics
    Figure 2 shows the percentage of individuals and pairs playing the risky option [Red] over time. In 
the first period, 64% of individual participants played the risky option whereas 36% played the safe 
option. By the last period, 84% played the risky option whereas 16% played the safe option. In terms 
of pair behavior (Table 1): in period 1, 48% of pairs achieved the payoff-dominant equilibrium (Red-
Red) by playing the risky option simultaneously, whereas 20% of pairs achieved the risk-dominant 
equilibrium (Blue-Blue). In the last period, 80% of pairs played the payoff-dominant equilibrium, 
whereas 12% pairs played the risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects changed strategies fairly often in 
the first four periods, but little changing occurred between periods 5 and 9. Some end-game effects 
were observed in period 10. In general, observed behavior is similar with that observed in Al-Ubaydli 
et al. (2013)’s experiment.
 
    Table 2 shows measures of risk aversion from the risk elicitation procedure. The measure of risk was 
calculated by assuming a constant relative risk aversion function.  Table3 shows descriptive statistics of 
the cautiousness measurement and other personality variables. Each personality variable is formed by 
averaging the five Likert scale items and subtracting 3, so that each ranges from -2 to 2. Figure3 shows 
the scatterplot of risk aversion against cautiousness. The two measures seem largely uncorrelated 
(Pearson’s product-moment correlation = 0.170, p=0.25, Spearman’s rank correlation= 0.20, p = 0.16, 
Kendall’s rank correlation= 0.16, p = 0.13). 
Result1: The risk-averse and cautiousness measures are independent from each other.
    This result is consistent with our discussion of the differences between risk aversion and cautiousness, 
as they are measuring different aspects of how people react to uncertainties
3.2. Subjective Beliefs and Decision Making
    A primary research question concerns the origin of participants’ beliefs. Accordingly, we examine 
predictions in the first period, prior to any interaction between the participants. Figure 4 shows 
	 There	are	also	other	complex	measures	for	risk	aversion	that	might	provide	more	refined	estimates	of	the	parameters	in	the	utility	
function	(e.g.	Kahneman	and	Tversky,	992;	Hey	and	Orme,	99;	Holt	and	Laury,	2002;	Barron	and	Erev,	200.)––but	the	trade-off	of	a	refined	
estimate	is	the	increased	complexity	of	the	task.		When	the	participants	are	confused	by	the	complex	task,	we	will	see	more	noise	in	the	result.	
Dave	et	al.	(200)	found	that	failing	to	account	for	noisy	behaviors	(or	errors)	may	bias	the	estimation	of	risk	aversion	parameter	significantly.
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the distribution of participants’ predictions in the first period. Whereas only 6% (3/50) indicated 
that they have no idea about their partners’ actions (by reporting a certainty of 0%), 62% (31/50) 
participants predicted that their partner will choose the risky option (Std.Dev. = 17.12), and 32% 
(16/50) participants predicted their partners will choose the safe option (Std.Dev. = 22.34). 
    We find that there is a clear connection between the participants’ prediction and their decision in 
the first period of the game. Specifically, participants’ decisions almost always match their prediction 
of their partner’s play regardless of the certainty level that they have reported (Table 4). Among 
participants who predicted that their partners will play red, 96.77% (30/31) of them also selected red, 
among participants who predicted their partners will play blue, 100% (16/16) of them also selected 
blue. This is in line with Neumann et al. (2009), who also found that the majority of the participants 
chose the strategies that were consistent with their stated first-order beliefs.
 Result 2: Subjective belief determines strategy selection independent of the certainty level.
    This result is consistent with our discussion on the role subjective belief played in decision making. 
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the stag-hunt game is to play the Red with a probability of 0.75 
and to play the Blue with a probability of 0.25. If the confidence level were to translate into probability 
and then serve as the base of decision-making as the expected-utility theory predicted, a risk-neutral 
decision maker will not play red unless she is at least 50% sure her partner will play red. Obviously, the 
externally determined probabilities cannot explain the underlying decision-making mechanism. 
3.3. Origin of subjective beliefs
    In section 1.1, we hypothesized that in the first period of the game, participants will make predictions 
using Stackelberg heuristics. Evidence from the experimental data suggests it is the cautiousness, rather 
than the risk aversion, that serves as the basis of such a heuristic. We first use the median value of the 
risk-averse measure to split the sample and find no significant difference between beliefs of the two 
groups (Table 5). Specifically, about the same proportion of risk-averse individuals (16/26=61.5%) 
and risk-seeking individuals (15/24=62.5%) believe that their partner will play the risky option in the 
first period. (Fisher exact test p=1.0). Conversely, a median split along the cautiousness measure shows 
marginally significant differences in predictions (Table 6).  Less cautious individuals are more likely to 
believe that their partner will choose the risky option (19/26=73%)  (Fisher exact test p=0.14). 
    To further examine the relationship between one’s risk aversion/cautiousness and subjective belief 
in period 1, we use a probit model to predict the binary prediction (red=1, ignoring certainty) as a 
function of the risk aversion measure and cautiousness measure, controlling for other personality 
traits and demographic factors (Table 7). We also use an OLS model in which the dependent variable 
1
is the overall certainty that the partner will play red, measured from -100 (certain partner will play 
blue) to 100. Lastly, for comparison, we also offer a probit regression on the participant’s first period 
choice rather than prediction.
    According to table7, the estimated parameters on risk aversion on all the three regressions indicate 
the risk aversion measure, has negligible, statistically insignificant effects on the participants’ binary 
prediction, precise prediction and decision. This result is consistent with findings from past studies 
(Neumann and Vogt, 2009; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2013, Büyükboyaci, 2014). Contrarily, the cautiousness 
measure has a large, statistically significant effect on the participants’ binary prediction and decision. 
The more cautious is a subject, the more one believes that the partner, too, is cautious in the sense 
that the partner is more likely to play the safe strategy, blue.  In addition, we notice that both the risk 
aversion measure and the cautiousness measure have statistically insignificant effect on the certainty 
level of prediction. 
Result 3: The traditional measure of risk aversion cannot explain individual subjective belief 
and strategic selection in the first period of the game.
Result 4: The psychological concept of cautiousness correlates with one’s belief that the partner 
will play the safe option in the first period of the game.
3.4. Evolution of beliefs
    In this section, we first look at how the participants update their subjective beliefs based on the 
outcome of the prior period. Results are summarized in table 8. For participants who played the risky 
option and ended up with the payoff-dominant equilibrium, 98% of them selected the risky option 
in the next period. It is clear that once the two participants in a pair played cooperatively together, 
the strategic uncertainty between them was eliminated immediately. However, for participants who 
played the risky option but ended up with a bad outcome (i.e., red-blue), 46% of them predicted that 
the partner would switch to the red in the next period. That is to say, strategic uncertainty led to 
variation in next period’s beliefs.
    To examine whether risk aversion/cautiousness plays a role in explaining the evolution of people’s 
subjective beliefs, we again use median splits, and classify participants as either more risk-seeking 
individuals or more risk-averse individuals. Accordingly, we identify three different types of pairs 
of partnered subjects: risk-seeking pairs (both participants are risk-seeking individuals), mixed 
pairs (one risk averse and one risk seeking participant), and risk-averse pairs (both are risk-averse 
individuals). We use the same method based on cautiousness to classify pairs as cautious pairs, mixed 
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pairs, and less-cautious pairs. Table 9 shows for each type of pair the proportion of periods in which 
different equilibria were achieved. On aggregate, 81.43% of risk-averse pairs and 88.33% of the risk-
seeking pairs achieved the payoff-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test p = 0.3343). 7.14% of risk-
averse pairs and 3.33% risk-seeking pairs achieved the risk-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test 
p =0.4503). Figures 5 and 6 show the proportion of pairs achieving the payoff-dominant equilibrium 
or risk-dominant equilibrium over time for each of the two groups. When we use the risk-averse index 
to mid-split the sample, we cannot observe any clear pattern over time. Therefore, we again confirm 
the findings from past studies who find that risk aversion does not explain individual behavior in this 
game. 
    When we use the cautiousness index to identify the pairs, we find 60% of the cautious pairs 
and 90% of the less-cautious pairs achieved the payoff-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test, 
p<0.0001). Additionally, 25% of the cautious pairs and 2.85% of the less-cautious pairs achieved the 
risk-dominance equilibrium (Fisher exact test p = 0.0002). Figures 7 and 8 show that 100% of the 
less-cautious pairs eventually achieved the payoff-dominant equilibrium (none of them achieved the 
risk-dominant equilibrium). For the cautious pairs, only 60% of them achieved the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium and 40% achieved the risk-dominant equilibrium. As we discussed in section 1.1, since 
cautious individuals are less likely to attempt the risky option in the early periods of the game, they 
will also less likely to update their beliefs based on positive feedback. As a consequence, the strategic 
uncertainty between the two players in a pair would impede them from cooperation.  Observations 
from the experiment supported our conjecture. 
Result 5: The traditional measure of risk aversion cannot explain individual subjective belief 
and strategic selection in the repeated game.
Result 6: The psychological concept of cautiousness negatively associates with the probability 
that one achieve the payoff-dominance equilibrium.
4. Conclusion
    This paper seeks to provide insight into how individual characteristics influence one’s decision 
making in a social cooperation environment. Specifically, we investigated how risk preference affects 
people’s subjective beliefs in a repeated coordination game. Moreover, in most past studies, the decision-
maker’s risk preference was often solely defined by the constant relative risk aversion. Accordingly, 
the only measure of risk preference was one’s selection in certain lottery games. In this study, we 
explored another aspect of risk preference beyond the traditional risk aversion measure. Integrating 
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insights gleaned from personality psychology with the literature on decision making, we put forward 
that cautiousness  plays a key role in determining the decision-maker’s subjective belief formation and 
strategy selection. 
    We designed and conducted a laboratory experiment to test this idea. In the first part of the experiment, 
the participants played a simple coordination game with fixed partners over ten periods. In each period, 
the participants made a selection between a safe option and a risky option. In addition, 
    we also elicited the participants’ beliefs by asking them to make predictions on their partners’ possible 
actions. We employed the binarized scoring rule (Hossain and Okui, 2013) to provide incentive to 
report one’s subjective belief truthfully. In the second part of the experiment, we used a subset of the 
International Personality Item pool (Goldberg, 1999) to measure the participants’ cautiousness level. 
In addition, we also assessed some other personality traits that might affect decisions in the game. 
Following the personality survey, the participants were asked to complete a demographic survey. In 
the last part of the experiment, we used the Eckel and Grossman (2008) lottery game to elicit the 
participants’ risk aversion, as in many past studies. 
    Based on the data generated from our laboratory experiment, results from previous studies are 
replicated: the risk aversion measure cannot explain the participants’ behavior in the simple 
coordination game. Nevertheless, evidences that are original from this paper suggest that cautiousness 
influences the participants’ subjective beliefs and decisions through two mechanisms: 1. in the first 
period of the game, cautiousness affects the way a decision-maker forming mental representations of 
her partner. Higher score on cautiousness leads the decision-maker more likely to believe her partner 
will play the safe option. Behaviorally, cautiousness negatively associates with the probability of playing 
the risky option. 2. in the repeated game, since higher score on cautiousness makes the decision maker 
less likely to try the risky option in early periods of the game, she would not have enough feedbacks 
to update her subjective belief effectively. Consequently, the uncertainty concerning her partner’s next 
move would make her less likely to achieve the payoff-dominance equilibrium.
    There are several limitations to the current study that ought to be addressed in future work. First, 
whereas an experimental design that does not have feedback to the participants who have chosen the 
safe option, it does not capture the full picture of belief formation and strategy selection. One-shot 
game design and random-partner design could be helpful extensions of this study. Second, it is also 
worth to take other popular measures of risk preference (e.g. Zukerman sensation seeking, Domain-
specific Risk-taking scale, Impulsiveness in the big five. etc) into consideration, as we are still far from 
achieving a sophisticated understanding on how individuals think, feel, and act under uncertain 
situations. Third, as in most past studies, the lottery game we used in this study was designed on the 
base of expect-utility theory, regardless of the fact that many experimental studies have shown that 
human decision making under uncertain situations are systematic deviations from the prediction of 
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the expected-utility theory (Loewenstein et al. 2001). A possible alternative is to measure the decision-
maker’s risk preference using instruments that are designed relying on prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Mishra et al., 2012). For example, Barron and Erve (2003) and Abdellaoui et al. 
(2008) are all possible candidates.
    Our investigation contributes to several literatures. Our findings contribute to decision making 
literature in that we emphasize not only on strategy selection, but also on the importance of subjective 
judgment during decision making. We contribute to the behavioral game theory literature, by examining 
how individual characteristics, especially risk preference, influence the equilibrium selection in a 
repeated coordination game where multiple equilibria could be recognized simultaneously. We identify 
cautiousness as an important, but previously unexamined, aspect of risk preference that affects the 
game outcome. Our work also speaks to the learning literature by demonstrating how cautiousness 
affects the way people react to past experiences, which have not been directly investigated in a 
coordination game context. 
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Appendix A. Tables and Figures
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Period	 Period	2 Period	 Period	 Period	5 Period	6 Period	7 Period	8 Period	9 Period	0
Percentage	of	Individual
Select	the	Red 0.6 0.86 0.7 0.8 0.82 0.86 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.8
Percentage	of	Pairs
Achieve	the	Red-Red 0.8 0.72 0.60 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.8 0.76 0.80
Percentage	of	Pairs
Achieve	the	Blue-Blue 0.20 0.00 0.2 0.08 0.2 0.08 0.08 0.6 0.20 0.2
Table1.	Detailed	descriptive	statistics	in	each	period	
Table2.	The	descriptive	statistics	of	the	estimated	risk	aversion	
Lottery Payoffs Prob. Risk* CRRA** Selection

$6.0 50
0.00 r>2.5 	(6%)
$6.0 50
2
$7.6 50
0.28 0.96<r<2.5 5	(0%)
$5.2 50

$9.2 50
0.57 0.75<r<0.96 9	(8%)
$. 50

$0.8 50
0.85 0.5<r<0.75 9	(8%)
$.6 50
5
$2. 50
. 0.<r<0.5 	(6%)
$2.8 50
6
$ 50
. 0.<r<0. (26%)
$2.0 50
7
$5.6 50
.70 0.22<r<0. 	(6%)
$.2 50
8
$7.2 50
.98 r<0.22 5	(0%)
$0. 50
#	of	Observations	=	50,	Standard	Deviation	=	2.02
Male	=	6	(2%),	Female	=		(68%),
*Risk	is	measured	as	standard	deviation	of	expected	payoff.
**	Assuming	a	contant	relative	risk	avere	utility	function	U(X)=X
(-r)
/(-r)
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Table3. The	desriptive	statistics	of	the	personality	survey	
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max No.	items
Cautiousness 0.28 0.6 -.0 .0 5
Trust	 0.6 0.50 -0.90 .60 5
Altruism	 .28 0.56 -0.0 2.00 5
Compliance	 0.72 0.67 -0.60 2.00 5
Competence	 .2 0.59 -0.60 2.00 5
Achievement	 .2 0.68 -0.80 2.00 5
Table4.	Subjective	beliefs	determine	strategy	selection
Select	Red Select	Blue
Believe	my	partner	
will	select	Red 98.25% 6.2%
Believe	my	partner	
will	select	Blue .75% 9.68%
#	of	Observations 0 95
Table5. The	estimated	risk	aversion	cannot	explain	the	predictions	in	period
Subjective	beliefs	in	period Risk-averse Risk-seeking
predict	Red 6	(6.5%) 5	(62.5%)
predict	Blue	or	No	Idea 0 9
#	of	Observations 26 2
Table6. Less-cautious	indiviuduals	are	more	likely	to	predict	the	risky	option	in	period	
Subjective	beliefs	in	period Risk-averse Risk-seeking
predict	Red 2	(50%) 9	(7.7%)
predict	Blue	or	No	Idea 2 7
#	of	Observations 2 26
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Table7.	The	cautiousness	explains	the	origin	of	the	subjective	belief
() (2) ()
Model Probit OLS Probit
Dependent	Variable
Predict	The	Other	
Person	Will	Play	Red
(dummy,	predict	red	=)
Precise	Predictions
Range	from	-00	(blue	for	
sure)	to	+00	(red	for	sure)
Play	Red
(dummy,	play	red=)
Risk Aversion 0.06 .76 0.5
(0.) (.96) (0.)
Cautiousness -0.95*** -22. -.02***
(0.8) (5.98) (0.)
Trust 0. 0.2 0.68
(0.8) (2.8) (0.52)
Altruism -0.05 -.07 -0.5
(0.0) (9.70) (0.6)
Compliance 0.6 7.65 0.67*
(0.8) (20.5) (0.7)
Competence 0.2 6.2 -0.6
(0.6) (2.5) (0.65)
Achivement-Striving 0.6 9.8 0.67*
(0.) (5.) (0.6)
Male	(dummy) 0.99* 8.67 .*
(0.58) (25.87) (0.62)
Age -0.0 0.97 -0.2
(0.28) (.9) (0.27)
Education -0.7 -8.0 0.07
(0.0) (.) (0.)
Constant -0.40 -41.03 3.12
(0.54) (60.21) (3.55)
Pseudo R-sqaure 0.18 0.19 0.24
Observation 50 50 50
Robust Std. Error
(cluster on individuals) YES YES YES
												***p	<	0.0,	**p<0.005,	*p<0.
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Positively	
Feedback
(Red-Red)
Negatively	
Feedback
(Red-Blue)
Believe	my	partner	will	
select	Red	in	the	Next	Period 97.8% 5.95%
Select	Red	in	the	Next	Period 96.60% 5.5%
#	of	Observations 2 7
Table8. Positive	feedback	effectively	eliminate	strategic	uncertainty
Mid-split	participants	with	Risk	aversion Mid-split	participants	with	Cautiousness
Risk	Averse	Pairs Risk	Seeking	Pairs Cautious	Pairs	 Less-Cautious	Pairs
%	of	pairs	achieved	
Red-Red
8.% 88.% 60% 90%
%	of	pairs	achieved	
Blue-Blue
7.% .% 25% 2.85%
#	of	Observations 7	x	0 6	x	0 6	x	0 7	x	0
Table9. Less-cautious	pairs	are	more	likely	to	achieve	the	payoff-dominant	equilibrium
3
Player 2
Red	 Blue
Player 1
Red 60, 60 0,	5
Blue 5,	0 45,45
Figure.	The	Stag-hunt	game
Figure2.	Percentage	of	individuals/pairs	select	the	risky	option
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Figure.	The	estimated	risk	aversion	and	the	cautiousness	are	not	correlated
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Figure.	Subjective	beliefs	in	period	are	highly	polarized
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Figure5.	The	estimated	risk	aversion	cannot	
explain	why	people	coverge	to	Red-Red
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Figure6.	The	estimated	risk	aversion	cannot	
explain	why	people	coverge	to	Blue-Blue
Figure7.	Less-cautious	pairs	are	more	likely
to	converge	to		Red-Red	over	time
Figure8.	Cautious	pairs	are	more	likely
to	converge	to		Blue-Blue	over	time
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Experiment Instructions
The	purpose	of	this	experiment	is	to	study	how	people	make	decisions	under	uncertain	situations.	The	
experiment	will	be	done	on	papers.	You	each	have	a	printed	copy	of	the	instruction.	I	will	now	read	the	
instruction	in	front	of	you.
Today’s	experiment	will	take	approximately	0	minutes.	You	will	finish	three	different	parts	through	
the	experiment.
If	you	pay	attention	and	make	good	decisions,	you	may	earn	a	considerable	amount	of	money.	Just	for	
showing	up,	you	have	earned	$.	All	earnings	for	today’s	tasks	will	be	in	addition	to	the	$.	You	will	
earn	“Points”	through	the	experiment.	At	the	conclusion	of	the	experiment,	you	will	be	paid	$1	for	
every	five	points	you	earned.	The	more	points	you	earn	the	more	monetary	payment	you	can	get.	At	
the	end	of	the	experiment,	you	will	be	paid	your	earnings	privately	and	in	cash.	You	will	not	be	paid	if	
you	leave	before	you	conclude	the	experiment.
There	are	three	parts	to	today’s	experiment.	In	part	1	and	part	3,	the	choices	that	you	make	will	
determine	your	earnings.	However,	you	will	only	be	paid	the	earnings	that	correspond	to	one	of	the	
two	parts.	At	the	end	of	the	experiment,	I	will	flip	a	coin	to	determine	which	of	these	two	parts	will	be	
used	to	determine	your	earnings.	You	will	have	the	same	chance	of	being	paid	for	each	of	these	two	
parts.	There	is	no	direct	payment	for	part	.
There	are	some	cards	in	this	box.	Please	pick	one	randomly.	The	number	on	that	card	will	be	your	
EXPERIMENT	ID.
For	the	remainder	of	this	experiment,	please	refrain	from	any	communication	with	other	participants.	
Please	put	away	your	cell	phones.
When	you	finish	reading	the	above	material,	please	wait	for	others.	When	everyone	is	ready,	we	will	
distribute	and	read	through	instructions	for	part	1.
Part1:
Introduction	to	the	procedures:
In	this	part,	you	will	be	paired	with	one	other	participant.	Each	of	you	will	be	matched	with	another	person	with	the	same	
ID	number	as	you	in	the	other	room.	You	will	interact	with	the	same	person	over	10	rounds.	In	each	round,	you	will	make	a	
choice	between	two	actions—	either	Red	or	Blue.
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	If	you	select	Blue,	then	you	earn		points	regardless	of	what	the	other	participant	selects.
	If	you	select	Red,	then:
	If	the	other	participant	also	selects	Red,	then	both	of	you	earn	0	points;
	If	the	other	participant	selects	Blue,	then	you	will	earn	0,	and	the	other	participant	will	
earn		points.
In	addition,	in	each	round,	you	will	make	a	prediction	about	the	other	participant’s	selection,	 and	indicate	 how	 confident	
you	are	in	your	prediction.	For	example,	you	can	indicate	 “I	think	 the	other	participant	will	select	Red,	and	I’m	30%	sure	
about	this.”	You	would	indicate	 this	prediction	by	drawing	a	vertical	bar	on	the	picture	below	(on	your	answer	sheet):
The	other	participant	faces	exactly	the	same	decision	and	earnings.	You	will	interact	with	the	same	person	over	10	rounds.
How	you	will	be	paid	in	Part1:
At the end of this part, one of the ten rounds will be randomly selected to determine your payment.
A.	 Payment	for	your	decisions
After	you	finish	all	the	ten	rounds,	I	will	roll	a	ten-sided	die	to	decide	which	round	will	be	used	to	determine	your	
payment	in	this	part.	The	outcome	in	the	randomly	selected	round	will	determine	how	many	points	you	earn	for	your	
decisions	in	this	part.
B.	 Payment	for	your	predictions
Your	payments	for	the	predictions	depend	on	three	things:	1.you	prediction,	.the	other	participant’s	choice,	3.	a	random	
number	from	0	to	100%.
You	will	earn		points	if:
•	 Your	prediction	is	correct	with	a	sufficient	large	confident	level.
•	 Your	prediction	is	wrong	with	a	sufficient	small	confident	level.	You	
will	loss		points	if:
•	 Your	prediction	is	correct	with	a	sufficient	small	confident	level,
•	 Your	prediction	is	wrong	with	a	sufficient	large	confident	level,
Define	vector	 	and	 	:	
If	you	report	red	with	a	positive	confidence	level	p,	then	 .
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If	you	report	blue	with	a	positive	confidence	level	p,	then	 .	
If	you	predicted	red	correctly,	then	you	earns		points	if		 	is	smaller	than	the	random	generated	
number	k;	otherwise	you	loses		points.	
If	you	predicted	red	wrongly,	then	you	still	earns		points	if		 	is	smaller	than	the	random	generated	
number	k,	otherwise	you	loses		points.	
If	you	predicted	blue	correctly,	then	you	earns		points	if	 	is	smaller	than	the	random	
generated	number	k;	otherwise	you	loses		points.
If	you	predicted	blue	wrongly,	then	you	still	earns		points	if	 		is	smaller	than	the	random	
generated	number	k,	otherwise	you	loses		points.
Effectively, one important thing I want to remind you is that telling the truth when reporting your 
prediction is optimal.
When	you	finish	making	prediction	and	decision	in	each	round,	please	hand	in	your	answer	sheet	to	the	
experimenter.	We	will	match	your	answer	with	the	other	participant’s,	record	the	other	participant’s	answer	
on	your	answer	sheet,	then	give	the	answer	sheet	back	to	you.	You	will	find	out	the	other	participant’s	
decision	in	that	round.	You	will	then	proceed	to	the	next	round.	In	short,	the	procedure	in	each	round	is	as	
follows:
After	you	finish	all	ten	rounds,	I	will	roll	a	ten-sided	die	to	decide	which	round	will	be	used	to	determine	your	payment	
for	this	part.	When	everyone	has	finished	all	ten	rounds,	we	will	move	to	part	.
When you are finished with these instructions and are ready to proceed, please start to make your 
prediction and decision for Round 1.
Part21
Please	answer	the	questions	carefully	and	truthfully.	We	guarantee	that	we	will	treat	these	surveys	with	
the	utmost	confidentiality.	I	will	now	read	the	instruction		in	front	of	you.	
This	part	contain	phrases	describing	people’s	behaviors.	Please	indicate	for	each	statement	whether	it	is:
1.	 Very	Inaccurate,
	 Q6,	Q2,	Q8,	Q2,	and	Q0	are	questions	toward	cautiousness.	Q2	and	Q0	are	reverse-scoring	questions.	
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.	 Moderately	Inaccurate,
3.	 Neither	Accurate	Nor	Inaccurate,
.	 Moderately	Accurate
.	 Very	Accurate
as	a	description	of	you.
Describe	yourself	as	you	generally	are	now,	not	as	you	wish	to	be	in	the	future.	Describe	yourself	as	
you	honestly	see	yourself,	in	relation	to	other	people	you	know	of	the	same	sex	as	you	are,	and	roughly	
your	same	age.	So	that	you	can	describe	yourself	in	an	honest	manner.
STATEMENTS	
Q1:	 I	believe	that	people	are	basically	moral	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	complete	tasks	successfully	1	 	 3	 	 
Q3:	 I	make	people	feel	welcome	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	am	easy	to	satisfy	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	go	straight	for	the	goal	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	avoid	mistake	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	believe	that	others	have	good	intentions	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	excel	in	what	I	do	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	anticipate	the	needs	of	others	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q10:	 I	can’t	stand	conforntations	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q11:	 I	work	hard	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	choose	my	words	with	care	 1	 	 3	 	 
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Q13:	 I	trust	what	people	say	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	handle	tasks	smoothly	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	love	to	help	others	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	hate	to	seem	pushy	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	turn	plans	into	actions	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	have	a	reserved	and	cautious	attitude	toward	life	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	suspect	hidden	motives	in	others	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q0:	 I	don’t	understand	things	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q1:	 I	make	people	feel	uncomfortable	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	Insult	people	1	 	 3	 	 
Q3:	 I	am	not	highly	motivated	to	succeed	1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	do	crazy	things	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	believe	that	people	are	essentially	evil	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	don’t	see	the	consequences	of	things	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	take	no	time	for	others	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	hold	a	grudge	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q:	 I	put	little	time	and	effort	into	my	work	 1	 	 3	 	 
Q30:	 I	often	make	last-minute	plans	 1	 	 3	 	 
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Part	3.	In	this	part,	you	will	select	from	among	eight	different	lotteries	the	one	lottery	you	would	like	to	
play.	The	eight	different	lotteries	are	listed	below.	You	must	select	one	and	only	one	of	these	lotteries.	
To	select	a	lottery,	place	an	X	in	the	appropriate	box.
Each	lottery	has	two	possible	outcomes	(ROLL	LOW	or	ROLL	HIGH)	with	the	indicated	probabilities	
of	occur.	Your	compensation	for	this	part	of	the	experiment	will	be	determined	by	which	of	the	eight	
lotteries	you	select;	and	which	of	the	two	possible	outcomes	occur.	For	example,	if	you	select	Lottery	
	and	ROLL	HIGH	occurs,	you	will	win		points.	If	ROLL	LOW	occurs,	you	will	win	1	points.	For	
every	lottery	except	Lottery	1,	each	ROLL	has	a	0%	chance	of	occur.	At	the	end	of	this	part,	you	will	
roll	a	ten	sided-dice	to	determine	which	event	will	occur.	If	you	roll	a	1,	,	3,	,	or	,	ROW	LOW	will	
occur.	If	you	roll	a	,	,	,		or	10,	ROLL	HIGH	will	occur.
When	you	are	finished	with	these	instructions	and	are	ready	to	proceed,	please	make	your	lottery	
selection	with	an	X	in	the	last	box	across	from	your	preferred	lottery.	When	you	finish	the	selection,	
please	notify	me.	You	will	then	roll	the	die.	After	that,	I	will	pay	your	earnings	privately	and	in	cash.
31
Essay 2
A Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation of the Context 
Effect in Economic Experiments: 
Evidence from a Laboratory Bribery Game
1. Introduction
    Formulating experiment instructions without a specific context has been the mainstream practice 
in the community of experimental economics, as many researchers are extremely concerned about 
potential data distortion caused by the connotations of a background story (see Lowenstein, 1999, for 
a detailed discussion). The rich literature has examined whether or not the context of an experiment 
affects people’s behavior (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Fehr et al., 1997, Abbink et al., 2006), but little 
consensus has been reached. Despite conflicting findings from past studies, the underlying reason that 
leads to those controversial findings has received little attention. In this paper, we try to identify the 
potential mechanism through which the context affects people’s decisions in economic experiments.
    Within the experimental economics literature, a commonly used method to study the context effect is 
to put a decision-maker in a position where he or she must decide whether to engage in economically 
rational but dishonest practices (see Bardhan, 2006, for a brief review). Under such circumstances, 
concerns about the moral obligation that is entailed in the experimental context might potentially 
change people’s behavior. Representative examples include Cooper et al. (1999), Barr et al. (2003), 
Abbink et al. (2006), Bardhan (2006), Barr and Serra (2009), and Armantier and Boly (2014). 
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    Mixed evidence has been found in past studies, and it seems that the experimental context affects 
subjects’ behavior in unpredictable ways. On one hand, many studies have shown that the experimental 
context does not affect people’s behavior (c.f. Table 1). Cooper et al. (1999)1 conducted a ratchet 
effect experiment in which the authors compared subjects’ decisions in an abstract context and a 
concrete context. They found that changing the experimental context had no effect on the student 
subjects’ behavior. Cooper and his colleagues conjectured that student subjects did not understand 
the connotation involved in the concrete context, as they had no “expertise” that was relevant to the 
context. Barr et al.  (2003)2 conducted an embezzlement experiment with both abstract and concrete 
contexts. They also found that both contexts deliver the same results. Abbink et al. (2006)3 conducted a 
bribery game experiment with two different versions of instructions, one with neutral descriptions and 
words and the other with suggestive words. They found no difference in people’s behavior. Accordingly, 
Abbink et al. (2006) conjectured that subjects will understand the experimental task by relying on the 
essential features of the task, rather than the suggestive words. Barr and Serra (2009)4 conducted 
another bribery game with both abstract and concrete contexts. In line with Abbinn et al. (2006), they 
found that various contexts had no impact on the bribee’s behavior. The authors conjectured that since 
the bribees in the game did not have similar experience in their lives before the game, they would hardly 
understand the meaning of their choices. Armantier and Boly (2014), conducted a bribery game with 
two concrete contexts but different framings. They found that framing the bribe as either bonus or 
penalty did not change people’s behavior. Their explanation was that people’s intrinsic motivation 
    In Cooper et al. (999), the concrete context was framed as interactions between “manager” and “worker”.
    In Barr et al. (003), the concrete context was framed as interactions between “health worker” and “community 
members”.
3    In Abbink et al. (006), the concrete context was framed as interactions between a “firm” and a “public officer”. To 
secure permmision to run an industrial plant which produces pollution, the firm can bribe the officer to influence the 
grant decision.
    Barr and Serra (009) implemented the bribery game in a one-shot pitty game. The concrete context was framed 
as interactions between “public servant” and “citizen”.
    In Armantier and Boly (0), the interaction was framed as interactions between firm manager and employee.
33
is identical across treatments. All the above example studies have shown evidence that supports the 
opinion that context does not affect behavior in laboratory experiments.
     On the opposite side, a considerable amount of evidence has shown that even the slightest change 
in experimental context can dramatically affect people’s decisions in social preference tasks (c.f. Table 
2). Eckel and Grossman (1996) conducted a dictator game with two treatments. The two treatments 
only differed in that in one the recipients were labeled as more “deserving.” The authors found that 
people tend to increase donations when the experimental context implies that the donation goes 
to a “deserving” recipient. The authors conjectured that context affects behavior by changing the 
perception of “fairness.” Cooper et al. (1999) found that changing the context affects subjects who are 
actual managers in real life. The authors conjectured that since those subjects had relevant “expertise” 
in their real lives, a concrete context made them more sensitive to an unethical decision. Laury and 
Taylor (2008) compared how the same individual makes decisions inside and outside the lab in a public 
good contribution setting. They found that people’s behavior in the lab cannot predict their decision 
Study Basic Setup Finding Conclusion
Cooper et al. (999) Ratchet effect experiment
Experimental context 
only has minimal 
impact on student 
subjects’ behavior
Student subjects do not have 
“expertise” for the task.
Barr et al. (003) Embezzlement experiment
Abstract context and 
concreate context 
deliver the same result
The subjects in different 
treatments have very similar 
backgrounds.
Abbink et al. (006) Bribery game experiment
Even heavy loaded 
experimental context 
does not change 
people’s behavior
The subjects will only 
understand the experimental 
task by its essential feature. 
Barr and Serra 
(009)         Bribery game
varied contexts had no 
impact on the bribees’ 
behavior
The subjects who played 
as the “bribree” do not have 
similar experience before 
Armantier and Boly 
(0) Bribery game
Framing the bribe 
as either “bonus” or 
“penalty” does not 
change behavior
The “intrinsic motivation” are 
in different treatments are 
identical
Table1. Evidence that support the opinion that context DOES NOT affect behavior
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even in very similar social preference tasks. Laury and Taylor conjectured that people’s behavior in an 
abstract context does not reflect their actual preference in reality. Barr and Serra (2009) found that 
various contexts affect the briber’s behavior dramatically. The authors argued that the concrete context 
elicited the subjects’ intrinsic motivation, which was essential in determining bribery behavior. 
    All of these attempts from both sides contributed to the heated and ongoing methodological debate, 
but a comprehensive interpretation of the underlying reasons of the context effect is still rare. In this 
paper, we incorporate insights gleaned from social psychology into economic experiments, and look 
for a fundamental interpretation of the context effect. We will show that experimental context and 
subject’s pre-game experience jointly influences decision making in a systematical and predictable 
way. We propose that a familiar decision-making context leads subjects to link the experimental task 
with their pre-game experiences. Consequently, the familiar-context amplifies subjects’ emotional 
stress of engaging in corruption, and makes them unlikely to behave unethically.
Study Basic Setup Finding Conclusion
Eckel and Grossman 
(996). Dictator game
people tend to increase 
donation when the context 
infers that a donation goes 
to a “deserving” recipient.
Context affect how people perceive 
“fairness”.
Cooper et al.(999). Ratchet effect experiment
Context affect the manager 
subjects’ behavior.
Managers have “expertise” for the 
game. The expertise changes their 
perceptions of the game.
Laury and Taylor 
(008).
Public good 
game
laboratory behavior cannot 
predict subjects’ behavior 
in similar social preference 
tasks with essential 
feature.
People’s behavior in the lab 
may not necessarily reflect their 
preference.
Capterner et al. 
(008).
Dictator game 
with different 
subjects
systematic differences 
between the choices of 
students and community 
members
student behavior is not very 
representative
Alatas et al. (009). Bribery game
public servants are much 
less likely to involve in 
dishonest practice
Public servant subjects have similar 
real-life experience
Barr and Serra 
(009). Bribery game
Context affect the briber’s 
behavior
Their behaviors are driven by 
“intrinsic motivation”
Table2. Evidence that support the opinion that context DOES affect behavior
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  Most people hold a positive view of themselves (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). In general, they 
consider themselves to be “moral, honest, and decent” individuals (Aronson, 1999; Mazar et al., 2008). 
This positive self-concept prevents them from behaving unethically (Manley et al., 2001). Actions that 
violate moral obligations or certain social standards invoke an aversive state, as the dishonest practice 
is inconsistent with the positive self-concept. Such aversive state is known as cognitive dissonance in 
social psychology (E. Aronson, 1992) 6. A key element that determines the intensity of the dissonance 
is personal involvement—the more attention one devotes to the unethical decision, the greater the 
dissonance (Mojzisch et al., 2006) experienced. As Aronson suggested:
“...cognitive dissonance theory makes its strongest and clearest predictions when the self-
concept of the individual is engaged. That is, in my judgment, dissonance is greatest and 
clearest when it involves not just any two cognitions but, rather, a cognition about the self 
and a piece of our behavior that violates that self-concept” (Aronson, 1960, 1992).
6    The cognitive dissonance theory was first proposed by L.Festinger (1957). It has been one of the most influential theories in the field of 
social psychology (Aronson, 1999). See Harmon-Jones and Harmon-jones (2007) for a brief review of the history of the theory.
No
If the experimental  context makes the subjects link 
their self-concept with the decision-making situation?
Yes
context does not
affect behavior
context does 
affect behavior
Examples:
evidence in 
Table1
Examples:
evidence in 
Table2
Figure1. The Cognitive Dissonance Interpretation
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    Returning to the study of experimental economics, an artificial context that is closely related to a 
subject’s pre-game experience orients the subject to associate the hypothetical scenario with his or her 
self-concept. Subjects will be more engaged in the task and devote more attention to their decisions. 
Accordingly, the cognitive dissonance evoked by dishonest practices (and their consequences) are 
magnified by the familiar interactive environment. Behaviorally, subjects are less likely to engage in 
dishonest practices. On the other side, an experimental context that is distant from pre-game experience 
leads subjects to be unattached to the task. The lack of personal involvement makes it easier to find 
external justifications for a dishonest practice. To escape from the aversive state and strive for self-
consistency, the reasoning would be: “This is just a game, I will not do that in real life” (although the 
subject had no similar experience in real life) or “I’m curious about what the consequences are for 
choosing this; let me try it out.” 
    With this insight, we will review the findings from past studies. Abbink et al. (2006) reported that 
variations in experimental contexts did not change subjects’ behavior in their bribery game experiment. 
The authors conjectured that the subjects understood the task based only on the essential feature 
of the bribery situation. However, there is an alternative explanation for their finding: The cognitive 
dissonance levels evoked by dishonest practices were the same in the two treatments. Accordingly, the 
subjects behaved in the same way. Barr and Serra (2009) found that higher negative externalities7  were 
associated with less dishonest practices. This finding can be seen as indirect evidence that supports 
our cognitive dissonance interpretation, as higher negative externalities may also evoke more intense 
dissonance for the person who behaves unethically.
    From past studies, we learned that a subject is less likely to engage in corruption when his or her 
experimental role is the same as the real-life identity (Cooper et al., 1999; Atalatas et al., 2009). In the 
    In Barr and Serra (2009), negative externality was defined as decreasing in monetary payment of a third party due to the corrupt activities.
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current study, we put forward that familiarity with the identity is a special case of familiarity with the 
context. As discussed earlier, the pre-game experience here is not limited to subjects’ real-life identity. 
Rather, it is an integration of one’s real-life role, expertise, knowledge, worldview, and all factors that 
contribute to the individual’s self-concept. As long as a subject is familiar with the context, he or she will 
link the experimental task to pre-game experiences.  Subsequently, the subject will be more sensitive 
to behavior that violates his or her self-concept (a positive self-concept for most people).
    Alatas et al. (2009) performed a corruption game experiment with Indonesian public servants and 
Indonesian students as two separate subject pools. They found significant differences in the behavior 
of the public servant and the student when each participated in the same bribery game framed as 
an interaction between firm manager and public servant. Specifically, they reported that the public 
servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance for corruption. Barr and Serra (2009) also argued 
that subjects’ real-life identity triggers the intrinsic motivation to abstain from an immoral decision. 
Here, we will first confirm this finding. Additionally, we propose that the intrinsic motivation in Barr 
and Serra (2009), on a fundamental level, is the need for self-consistency. To put it in another way, in 
a familiar decision-making context, people will abstain from an immoral decision to avoid cognitive 
dissonance that may threaten their positive self-concept (Lindzey and Aronson, 1985). We will use a 
laboratory experiment to show that cognitive dissonance which is manipulated by the experimental 
context influences a subject’s decision—even in situations where the role he or she plays in the 
experiment differs from the real-life identity.
     In summary, this paper explores how the experimental context affects people’s decisions in a simple 
laboratory bribery game. The intensity of cognitive dissonance  evoked  by engaging in  a dishonest 
practice is manipulated by the experimental instructions. The same experimental task is presented 
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to the student subjects, but with three different instructions. Specifically, we use three treatments, 
one with familiar-context instruction, one with unfamiliar-context instruction, and one with context-
free instruction. In the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment, we do not find 
statistically different outcomes. This result is consistent with findings from past studies. In contrast, we 
find that the student subjects in the familiar-context treatment are much less likely to engage in corrupt 
activities. In addition, students who engage in corrupt activities in the familiar-context treatment 
require more monetary compensation to justify their decisions. Findings from this paper suggest that 
cognitive dissonance associated with the context is the primary factor that causes different outcomes 
across the treatments. This paper provides a unified interpretation of the controversial findings from 
past studies.  
    We do not think our results should be taken to suggest that a context-free design in economics 
experiments is misguided. In fact, our belief is that 
researchers should always keep the experimental design as simple as possible, but not missing any 
essential element. In studies investigating whether non-monetary payoffs play a vital role in reality, 
we should definitely take those factors into consideration. The corruption experiment we conduct in 
this study is a good example in which cognitive dissonance is extremely important. When we try to 
use a laboratory experiment to simulate corruption in the real world, it is necessary to consider how 
the subjects’ pre-game experience and the context jointly affect the outcome. However, in experiments 
investigating whether cognitive dissonance is not essential in real life, a context-free design might be 
a better option, as it would help keep the experiment simple to understand. For example, if the desire 
is to elicit a subject’s risk aversion level (in economics sense), a simple context-free design is the best 
option for both the subject and the experimenter.
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2. Experimental Design and Administration
    The experiment is conducted at Jianghan University (Wuhan, China) in the 2015 fall semester. 
Subjects are recruited from the population of undergraduate students in the school of business. In 
total, 250 undergraduates are randomly invited and participate in the experiment; 13 experiment 
sessions are conducted, with either 10 subjects or 20 subjects in each.  Sessions last 60 minutes on 
average (including check-in and payment processing). All the sessions are conducted with computer-
based materials. The experimental program is developed using z-tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made 
Economic Experiments, Urs Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects earn “points” (the fictitious experimental 
currency) through the experiment. At the experiment’s conclusion, subjects are paid 1 RMB (=0.16 US 
dollar) for every 100 points they earn. The subjects are paid their earnings privately and in cash. The 
average earnings were 30 RMB (including 5 RMB show-up fee)8. In summary, the experiment consists 
of two parts: a simple bribery game and a short questionnaire asking about subjects’ decisions and 
reasoning in the game. In addition to the laboratory bribery game, we conduct an independent attitude 
survey to measure people’s attitude toward corruption in each context. 
The Laboratory Bribery Game
    In the experiment, we use a simple laboratory bribery game to simulate a scenario in which corrupt 
activities may occur. Ten subjects make up a group. In each group, 5 people play as potential bribers 
(player1 below), the other 5 people play as potential bribees (player2 below). Each player2 allocates 
1000 points among the 5 player1s. According to the game rules, player2 shall splits the 1000 points 
equally, allowing each player1 to earn 200 points. In addition, each player1 is randomly paired with 
one player2 to play the game in pairs. The two anonymous subjects in a pair interact with each other 
    At Jianghan university, 30RMB is approximately the cost of 5 one-person meal in student dinning hall.
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over 15 periods.
    At the beginning of each period, each player1 receives 200 points as an initial endowment. Player2 
has no endowment. Player1 first decides whether to make a private transfer to the player2 in his or 
her pair. If the decision is to transfer, the subject must specify an integer in the range from 1 to 200 
points. Following that decision, player2 decides whether to accept or reject the bribe. If accepting it, 
then the amount offered is deducted from player1’s account and added to player2’s account. If player2 
rejects the bribe, then both players’ accounts remain unchanged. Last, player2 decides how to allocate 
the 1000 points. If abiding by the game rules, then each player1 earns 200 points. If violating the 
game rules, then the player1 in the pair earns 1000 points, and the others earn nothing. After all the 
allocation decisions have been made, player1 seeks feedback on how many points were received from 
each player2. Thus, player1 can infer whether or not corrupt activities exist in the group. Since corrupt 
activities often impose non-trivial negative externalities on other society members, it is reasonable to 
let the subjects know what happens around them. The subjects will never know the identities of the 
others in the experiment. 
    The game is repeated for 15 periods. At the end of period 15, all the subjects are assigned to a new 
role and then paired with a new partner to play the game for another 15 periods. During the iterations, 
a pair of subjects is identified as a “foul” if any offer from player1 is accepted by player2. By the end of 
the experiment, a lottery is played out to decide whether to punish the subjects who violated the game 
rules. With a probability of 1%, the punishment occurs: Both players’ earnings are cleared from their 
accounts. The extremely low probability reflects that most corrupt activities in reality are difficult to 
reveal. As a matter of fact, many corrupt activities are even unobservable. The severe penalty represents 
the consequences arising from discovery of corrupt activities.
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    Figure 2 depicts the extensive form of the game in each round. Player1 is the potential briber, player2 
is the potential bribee. T denotes the number of points offered by player1. X and Y denote the possible 
penalty for player1 and player2. 
    The equilibria of the game are easy to obtain. On an equilibrium path, a player2 is indifferent between 
“abide by the rules” and “violate the rules,” as the determination of foul is based on the decision 
regarding whether or not to accept the bribe, rather than the decision regarding points allocation. 
Accordingly, player2 will play the two alternatives with the same probability (50%). Furthermore, 
player2’s expected payoffs for accepting the bribe is T-Y, which is greater than 0. Therefore, player2 will 
always accept the bribe being offered. Given that, the expected payoffs of a player1 who offers T points 
to his or her partner is (1200-2T-2X)/2, which is lower than the expected payoffs of offering nothing 
(1200/2=600). That is, not bribing is the dominant strategy for player1. In equilibrium, player1 does 
Player1
Player2 Player2
No 
contact
transfer
T points
(1 ≤ T ≤ 200 )
violate the rule:  one of the 
player1s earns 1000 points
follow the rule: each of the 
player1s earns 200 points
Player2
violate
the rule
abide by
the rule
violate
the rule
abide by
the rule
abide by
the rule
violate
the rule
accept reject
Player2
 (1000,0) 
 (1000,0) 
 (200,0) 
 (200-T-X, T-Y)  (1000-T-X, T-Y)  (200, 0) 
Figure2. The extensive form of the game
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not offer a bribe to player2, and player2 violates the allocation rule with a probability of 50%.
    Three treatments are conducted with the same bribery game framework as introduced above. The 
treatments only vary in the experimental instructions. In the first treatment, the game is presented 
as a scholarship allocation scenario in a college9 (familiar context treatment below). In the second 
treatment, the game is presented as a competitive bidding scenario among firms (unfamiliar-context 
treatment below). In the third treatment, the game is presented in an abstract form without any specific 
scenario or role (context-free treatment below). Table 3 summarizes the roles and terminology for 
the alternatives in each of the treatments. To avoid potential data distortion caused by suggestive 
wording10 , all the alternatives were presented with neutral terminologies in all the treatments. All 
subjects are randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. In total, 100 students participated in 
the familiar-context treatment, 110 students in the context-free treatment, and 40 students in the 
unfamiliar-context treatment. Following the bribery game experiment, the subjects then finish a short 
open-ended questionnaire. In the questionnaire, the subjects report their decisions in the game, and 
briefly explain their rationale behind their decisions.  
The Attitude Survey
    To validate the cognitive dissonance interpretation we propose here, we conduct a survey with a 
separate subject pool to measure students’ attitudes toward corrupt activities in each of the contexts. 
In addition to the laboratory bribery game, 90 students are randomly invited to respond to an attitude 
survey. The respondents are asked to indicate their attitudes on a 7-point Likert scale toward corrupt 
activities in one of the three contexts (with 30 respondents in each context). The respondents of the 
attitude survey and the subjects of the laboratory bribery game come from the same college (JiangHan 
University). They are very similar in age, education, and social experience. Such design allows us to 
9    At the Jianghan University (and perhaps many other colleges in China), the academic advisor is in charge of scholarship allocation.
0    In the Chinese language and culture, the word “bribery” is often used in an extremely derogatory sense.
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obtain measures for attitudes that are not influenced by decisions in the laboratory bribery game. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first bribery game experiment to use an independent survey to 
measure cognitive dissonance level.
3. Results
Attitudes toward corrupt activities in each of the contexts.
    Figure 3 shows the distribution of people’s attitudes toward corruption in each of the contexts. 
Keep in mind that the respondents of the attitude survey did not participate in the laboratory bribery 
game, so their responses are not influenced by the game. In total, 90 students respond to the attitude 
survey, 30 in each context. According to the result, the mean scores toward corrupt activities are 
2.793 and 2.414 for player1 and player2. That is, most of the students hold negative views on corrupt 
activities. These negative attitudes are amplified by the familiar (college) context among the student 
Table3. The contexts and vocabulary used in the three treatments.
Treatments familiar context unfamiliar context context-free
Earnings Scholarship Profits Points
Player1’s role Student Tender Applicant
Player1’s 
alternatives
alternative1 make a transfer make a Transfer make a Transfer
alternative2 no contact no contact no contact
Player2’s role Advisor Tenderee Granter
Playr2’s
alternative
alternative1 abide by the rule abide by the rule abide by the rule
alternative2 violate the rule violate the rule violate the rule
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respondents. In terms of attitudes toward player1’s bribery, the mean score is 1.57 (Std.dev.=1.30) 
in the familiar-context survey,  3.85 (Std.dev.=2.05) in the unfamiliar-context survey, and 3.07 (Std.
dev.=1.78) in the context-free survey. The t-test result suggests that the mean score in the familiar-
context survey is substantially lower than that in the other two surveys (p<0.001 for both). The mean 
attitude score toward player2’s corrupt activities is 1.43 (Std.dev.=1.01) in the familiar-context survey, 
3.30 (Std.dev=1.98) in the unfamiliar-context survey, and 2.60 (Std.dev.=1.67) in the context-free 
survey. This result indicates that the students hold the strongest negative attitudes toward player2’s 
corrupt activity in the real-life-context survey (mean comparison tests:  p<0.001).
    As the survey respondents and the laboratory game participants are very similar in background, 
we conjecture that they also share similar opinions toward corrupt activities. Thus, a student subject 
in the laboratory game would experience the strongest cognitive dissonance if he or she engages in 
corrupt activities in a hypothetical scholarship allocation scenario. 
    Additionally, no evidence suggests that the respondents’ attitudes in the unfamiliar-context survey 
are significantly different than in the context-free survey (mean comparison result: p=0.1299 to 
player1s’ corrupt activities, and p = 0.1535 to player2s’ corrupt activities). We then conjecture that the 
Figure3. The students hold exteremely negative attitudes toward corrupt activities in the college context
Attitudes toward player’s corrupt activities Attitudes toward player’s corrupt activities
Extremely Agree
Moderately Agree
Somewhat Agree
Not Sure
Somewhat Disagree
Moderately Disagree
Extremely Disagree
familiar
context
unfamiliar
context
context 
free
familiar      
context
unfamiliar 
context
context 
free

6


3


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students in the bribery game experiment would behave similarly in the unfamiliar-context treatment 
and the context-free treatment.
Corrupt activities in the laboratory bribery game.
    In general, the frequency of a player1’s bribery attempts is 31.13% in the familiar-context treatment, 
39.81% in the unfamiliar-context treatment, and 41.83% in the context-free treatment. Fisher exact 
test results indicate that the familiar-context treatment has the lowest bribery rate (Fisher exact 
test p <0.0001 in comparison to the unfamiliar-context and p <0.0001 in comparison to the context-
free treatment).  No evidence suggests that the player1’s bribery rate in the unfamiliar treatment 
is significantly different than in the context-free treatment (Fisher exact test p = 0.4089). Table 4 
summarizes the player1s’ behavior. In the familiar-context treatment, 36% of the individual player1s 
never tried to bribe their partners; this proportion is 20% in the unfamiliar-context treatment 
(significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.0480) and 17.27% 
Never violate the rule             
(attempt=0/15)
No more than one time         
(attempts <=1/15)
Constantly violate the rule         
(attempts >= 8/15)
Familiar  
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
Familiar  
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
Familiar  
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
64/100 7/40 33/110 74/100 9/40 56/110 5/100 4/40 12/110
64.00% 17.50% 30.00% 74.00% 22.50% 50.91% 5.00% 10.00% 10.91%
Table5. Players (potential bribees) in the familiar context treatment are less likely to violate the rule
Never offer a bribery             
(attempt=0/15)
No more than one time         
(attempts <=1/15)
Constantly offer bribery         
(attempts >= 8/15)
Familiar 
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
Familiar  
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
Familiar 
context
Unfamiliar 
context
Context 
free
36/100 8/40 19/110 43/100 8/40 28/110 29/100 15/40 41/110
36.00% 20.00% 17.27% 43.00% 20.00% 25.45% 29.00% 37.50% 37.27%
Table4. Players (potential bribers) in the familiar context treatment have less bribing attempts
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in the context-free treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact 
test p=0.0017). In the experiment, some of the player1s may have selected the bribery option by 
mistake (or perhaps to become familiar with the game). Among all the player1s in the familiar-context 
treatment, 43% made bribery attempts no more than 1 time (out of 15 periods); this number is 20% 
in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher 
exact test p=0.0079) and 25.45% in the context-free treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-
context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.0055). These observations indicate that the player1s in the 
familiar-context treatment are much less likely to bribe their partners. 
 
    We then compare the outcomes in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment. 
We do not find any significant differences (proportion of subjects who never offer bribe: p=0.8922; 
proportion of subjects who offer a bribe no more than 1 time: p=0.478; proportion of subjects who 
constantly offer a bribe: p =1.0). This result is consistent with Abbink et al. (2006).
The player violate the rule without any bribery from the player
 Familiar context Unfamiliar context Context-free
3/033 /39 30/993
.6% .6% 3.09%
Table8. In the familiar context treatment, interactions initiated by the player are rare.
Corruption never happened (no bribery, no violation)
Familiar context Unfamiliar context Context-free
990/00 30/600 863/60
66% 0.83% 3.0%
Table6. Corruption is less likely to happen in the familiar context treatment.
The player rejected the bribery from the player
Familiar context Unfamiliar context Context-free
38/6 9/ 0/6
8.8% 63.3% .%
Table7. The familiar context treatment has the higest bribery rejection rate.
47
    Table 5 summarizes the frequencies of the player2s’ corrupt activities (i.e., violate the rule when 
allocating resources). The proportion of subjects who never violate the rule is 64% in the familiar-
context treatment and 17.50% in the unfamiliar-context treatment. These two proportions are 
significantly different (Fisher exact test p<0.0001). The player2s in the familiar-context treatment are 
also much more likely to abide by the rules than those in the context-free treatment (Fisher exact test 
p<0.0001). The proportion of subjects who never violate the rule is 17.50% in the unfamiliar-context 
treatment and 30% in the context-free treatment. Again, the difference is not statistically significant 
(Fisher exact test p=0.147). 
    In short, the possibility of engaging in corruption is obviously, in a statistical sense, lowest in the 
familiar-context treatment, for both the player1s and the player2s. Observations from the bribery 
game, together with evidence from the attitude survey, suggest that the artificial familiar context 
amplifies the cognitive dissonance of engaging in dishonest practices, thus preventing the student 
subjects from performing unethical behavior. In addition, in line with past studies, we do not find 
essential differences in the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment.
    Upon completion of the bribery game, all the subjects are asked to complete an open-ended survey 
about their decisions and reasoning in the bribery game. According to the survey, 54% of the subjects 
in the familiar-context treatment mentioned the college background. Among them, only 6% engaged 
in corruption in the experiment. 
    We also find that the frequency of offering a bribe while playing the briber and the frequency of 
violating the rules while playing the bribee are positively correlated (correlation = 0.4208, t=6.6839, 
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p<0.0001). This finding indicates that corrupt behavior is likely to be related to certain aspects of 
individual characteristics (such as personality traits). 
    Next, we examine the interactions between player1 and player2 in a pair. We find that a reciprocal 
relationship between the two players is less likely to be established in the familiar-context treatment 
(Table 6). Specifically, 66% of the time corrupt activity never occurs (i.e., player1 never offers  his 
or her partner a bribe, and player 2 never violates the rules) in the familiar-context treatment. This 
percentage is 50.83% in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-
context treatment, Fisher exact test p <0.0001) and 53.20% in the context-free treatment (significantly 
lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p <0.0001). Moreover, the player2s in 
the familiar-context treatment are more likely to reject the bribery from the other person (Table 7). In 
aggregate, 81.58% of the bribes from the player1 were rejected in the familiar-context treatment. This 
percentage is 63.35% in the unfamiliar-context treatment (significantly lower than in the familiar-
context treatment, Fisher exact test p<0.0001) and 77.12% in the context-free treatment (significantly 
lower than in the familiar-context treatment, Fisher exact test p=0.075). In addition, from Table 8, we 
can see that only 4.16% of the interactions are initiated by player2 in the familiar-context treatment 
(i.e., player2 violates the game rules without an offer from player1). This proportion is also the lowest 
among the three treatments. Again, we do not see different results in the unfamiliar-context treatment 
and the context-free treatment.
    To further examine whether the familiar-context is inversely related to the probability of engaging in 
corruption, we perform several regression analyses. We first use ordinary least squares (OLS) models 
to predict player 1’s bribery decisions (individual bribery rate) as a function of the context dummies 
and other controls (regression1 to regression3 in Table 9). Following that, we provide regressions in 
which player2’s violation decisions (individual violation rate) are predicted as a function of the context 
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dummies and the amount of money being offered by player1 with the controls (regressions 4-6 in Table 
9). In the data, we observe many subjects who never engage in any corrupt activities throughout the 
whole experiment. Thus, we take player1’s bribery decision as a binary variable. That is, if a player1 
() () (3) () () (6)
Player Player
dependent variable  bribery rate
bribery 
rate
 bribery 
rate
 violation 
rate
violation 
rate
 violation 
rate
model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
familiar context 
(treatment dummy)
-0.098*** 
(0.039)
not 
included
-0.09*** 
(0.0)
-0.0*** 
(0.0)
not 
included
-0.086*** 
(0.06)
unfamiliar contextand 
and context-free
(treatment dummy)
unfamiliar 
context --
0.06 
(0.0)
0.0 
(0.0) --
0.0 
(0.03)
0.06 
(0.03)
context-free -- -- -- --
male 0.*** (0.08)
0.3*** 
(0.06)
0.*** 
(0.08)
0.086*** 
(0.033)
0.9** 
(0.08)
0.086** 
(0.03)
Constant 0.36*** (0.0)
0.30*** 
(0.03)
0.3*** 
(0.03)
0.66*** 
(0.06)
0.6*** 
(0.08)
0.*** 
(0.0)
Observations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust S.D. YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squred 0.06 0.308 0.06 0.09 0.0 0.03
Table9. Familiar context dummy negatively predict unethical behavior (OLS regression)
() () (3) () () (6)
Player Player
dependent variable
bribe 
decision 
(binary)
bribe 
decision 
(binary)
bribe 
decision 
(binary)
violation 
decision 
(binary)
violation 
decision 
(binary)
violation 
decision 
(binary)
model Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
familiar context 
(treatment dummy)
-0.99*** 
(0.8)
not 
included
-0.6*** 
(0.99)
-.00*** 
(0.)
not 
included
-0.9*** 
(0.83)
unfamiliar contextand 
and context-free
(treatment dummy)
unfamiliar 
context --
-0.098 
(0.68)
-0.096 
(0.0) --
0.08 
(0.68)
0.08 
(0.69)
context-free -- -- -- --
male 0.868*** (0.66)
0.3** 
(0.3)
0.86*** 
(0.66)
0.8*** 
(0.3)
0.3 
(0.98)
0.8*** 
(0.)
Constant 0.8*** (0.)
0.8*** 
(0.8)
0.8 
(0.6)
0.*** 
(0.6)
0.3*** 
(0.3)
0.*** 
(0.3)
Observations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust S.D. YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squred 0.08 0.033 0.08 0.3 0.030 0.30
Table10.  Familiar context dummy negatively predict unethical behavior (Probit regression)
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never bribes his or her partner, it takes the value of 0; otherwise, it takes the value of 1. We then predict 
this binarized bribery decision as a function of the context dummies and other controls (regressions 
1–3 in Table 10). Similarly, we predict the binarized rule violation decision of player2 as a function 
of the context dummies and other controls (regressions 4-6 in Table 10). As the results suggest, the 
familiar-context dummy is negatively related to the probability of engaging in corrupt activities. This 
effect is highly robust to changes in specification. The magnitude of the parameters is much larger 
in the probit regressions than in the OLS regressions. In addition, we also find that male subjects are 
more likely to engage in corrupt behavior than female subjects.
    Last, we look at the bargaining between the two players in the repeated game. During the iteration, 
if a player1’s bribery is rejected by a player2, then player1 can try to increase the offer to “buy” the 
Treatments Average offer Average accepted offer Difference
Familiar context 3.9/00 39./00 9.66
Unfamiliar context 60.3/00 .8/00 8.
Context-free 0.0/00 08.0/00 6.
Table11. Subjects in the real-life-context treatment required more monetary compensation
Figure4. Evolution of the player’s bribery decision
The player’s 
bribery decision
(rel. frequency)0.6
0.60
0.
0.0
0.
0.0
0.3
0.30
0.
0.0
0.00
0  0  0  30
   Period
unfamiliar context
 context-free
familiar context
The player’s 
rule-violation decision 
(rel.frequency)
0.30
0.
0.0
0.
0.0
0.0
0  0  0  30
   Period
unfamiliar-context
 context-free
familiar context
Figure5. Evolution of the player’s rule-violation decision
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partner. We use the difference between the average offered bribe and the average accepted bribe to 
capture the difficulty of establishing a reciprocal (yet corrupt) relationship between the two players. 
According to Table 11, the player1s in the familiar-context treatment have to pay the most money to 
persuade the player2s to become involved in a dishonest practice. This finding is consistent with the 
prediction of cognitive dissonance theory in that the student subjects in the familiar-context treatment 
require more monetary compensation (as external justification) to reduce their extremely intense 
cognitive dissonance. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the evolution of the player1’s bribery decisions 
(as a binary choice) and the evolution of the player2’s rules-violation decisions (as a binary choice). In 
most of the 30 periods, corrupt activities are less likely to be observed in the familiar-context treatment. 
Note that the subjects change their roles and re-pair with  new partners after period 15. Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 depict the aggregate pattern of the subjects’ choices. 
4. Conclusion and future direction
    It has become standard for economists to present experimental tasks using context-free instructions. 
A large number of past studies has looked at whether variations in the experimental contexts influence 
people’s decisions, with mixed evidence being reported and little insight being provided to explain the 
underlying mechanism.
    In the current study, we propose that the experimental context affects the subject’s behavior through 
the channel of cognitive dissonance, defined as the aversive state when people engage in a dishonest 
practice that is inconsistent with their positive self-concept. We show that the experimental context 
and subjects’ pre-game experience jointly influence decision making in a systematic and predictable 
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way.  Our findings, along with indirect evidence from past studies, indicate that a familiar decision-
making context leads subjects to link the experimental task with their self-concept. Consequently, the 
familiar context amplifies subjects’ emotional stress of engaging in corruption and makes them less 
likely to behave unethically.
    We conduct a simple laboratory bribery game in which the intensities of cognitive dissonance 
are controlled. Specifically, we carry out three different treatments: a familiar-context treatment 
(associates with the most intense cognitive dissonance), an unfamiliar-context treatment, and a 
context-free treatment. We find that corrupt activities are substantially fewer in the familiar-context 
treatment than in the other two treatments. In addition, we find that the student subjects in the 
familiar-context treatment require more external justification (monetary compensation) to reduce the 
dissonance evoked by their corrupt activities. Moreover, we replicate the results from past studies: In 
the unfamiliar-context treatment and the context-free treatment, we do not find essential differences 
in the subjects’ behavior.
    We do not think our results should be seen as a whole rejection of the context-free design approach. 
Instead, the point we are trying to make is that we should always keep our experimental design as 
simple as possible, but not simpler. In reality, moral obligation and the positive self-concept play a 
vital role in corruption decision making; therefore, it is important to simulate these non-monetary 
payoffs while conducting laboratory experiments. In experiments in which self-concept and cognitive 
dissonance are not an essential consideration, using a context-free design is more advantageous. 
    Our research contributes to one of the persistent, but still far from settled questions on experimental 
methodology: What is the right way to present experimental tasks to subjects? The experiments 
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considered here are intended to be a step in the direction of testing the role of context in economics 
experiments. Despite most experimental studies being conducted using context-free instructions, 
many researchers have argued that such practice impairs the external validity of results generated 
from laboratory experiments (e.g., Loomes, 1999), especially when researchers simulate situations 
that are relevant to real-life problems. To the best of our knowledge, very few attempts have been made 
to verify the above concern. To address this question, we will track each subject in our experiment 
through his or her entire college career. In addition, we will try to take the subjects’ personality traits 
into consideration. Hopefully, we will be able to provide more solid evidence of the impact of context 
by looking at how people’s decisions in the laboratory experiment relate to their decisions in reality.
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Translated attitude survey: familiar context
Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below. 
Imagine a scholarship allocation scenario in a college. In total five students applied the same 
scholarship. There are 1000 dollars available in the award pool. All the student applicants are equally 
qualified. According to the college policy, the dean shall split the $1000 dollars among the five 
applicants. That is to say, each of the applicants shall receive an award of $200.
However, prior to the scholarship allocation decision, one of the five students talked to the college 
dean, sent him a gift that worth $200 (secretly and privately). As return, the dean announced that 
student as the only person who won the scholarship, distributed all $1000 to her. All other applicants 
earned nothing. The interaction between the student and the dean will not be discovered by others.
Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the 
STUDENT and the DEAN’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be completely 
honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you submit will 
be completely confidential.
For the STUDENT:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
For the DEAN:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
You are: Male  Female
Translated attitude survey : unfamiliar context 
Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below. 
Imagine a public bidding scenario in the electronic construction industry. In total five firms 
submitted bids for the same project. The project will generate a profit of 1000 points (the fictitious 
currency in this scenario). All the firm applicants are equally qualified. According to the industry 
regulation, the tenderee shall let the five bidders to cooperate on the project, each of them shall 
receive a profit of 200 points (1/5 of the 1000 points). 
However, prior to the final decision, one of the five bidders talked to the tenderee, sent him a gift that 
worth 200 points (secretly and privately). As return, the tenderee announced that bidder as the only 
firm who won the bid. Consequently, the winning bidder earned all the 1000 points. All other bidders 
earned nothing. The interaction between the firm and the tenderee will not be discovered by others.
Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the TENDER 
and the TENDEREE’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be completely 
honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you submit will 
be completely confidential.
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For the Tender:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
For the TENDEREE:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
You are: Male  Femal
Translated attitude survey : context free
Please read the following paragraphs, and then response to the questions below. 
Imagine a game where people allocate Points (the fictitious currency in the game). There are five 
applicants and one granter. 1000 points will be distributed among 5 applicants. All the applicants are 
equally qualified.  According to the game rule, the granter shall split the 1000 points among the five 
applicants. That is to say, each of the applicants shall receive an award of 200 points (1/5 of the 1000 
points).
However, prior to the final decision, one of the five applicants talked to the granter, sent him a gift 
that worth 200 points (secretly and privately). As return, the granter announced that applicant as 
the only person who won the award. Consequently, that applicant earned all the 1000 points. All 
other applicants earned nothing. The interaction between the applicant and the granter will not be 
discovered by others.
Please select the response that indicates the degree to which you agree or disagree with the 
APPLICANT and the GRANTER’s activities. There is no right or wrong answer, so try hard to be 
completely honest in your responses. You can state your opinions accurately as the information you 
submit will be completely confidential.
For the APPLICANT:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
For the GRANTER:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Moderately Somewhat Not Sure Somewhat Moderately Extremely
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree
You are: Male  Female
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Experiment Instruction
Welcome to the decision-making lab of the Jianghan University of China. The purpose of this experiment is to 
study how people make decisions in a social interactive situation. If you pay attention and make good decisions, 
you may earn a considerable amount of money. Just for showing up, you have earned 5RMB. All earnings for 
today’s tasks will be in addition to the 5RMB. You will earn “Points” through the experiment. At the conclusion 
of the experiment, you will be paid 1RMB for every 100 points you earned. The more points you earn the more 
monetary payment you can get. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings privately and in 
cash. You will not be paid if you leave before you conclude the experiment. For the remainder of this experiment, 
please refrain from any communication with other participants. Please put away your cell phones.
In the first part of the experiment, we will simulate a scholarship allocation scenario. There are two roles in the 
experiment:
 1. Student (apply for scholarship)
 2 .Academic advisor (allocate the scholarship)
Each participant in the experiment will be randomly assigned with one of the two roles. 10 participants will 
make up of a group. In each group, there are 5 students and 5 academic advisors. Each student applies for 5 
different scholarships (scholarship A to scholarship E). Each academic advisor is in charge of allocating one 
of the 5 scholarships. In addition, each student will be randomly paired with an academic advisor. Prior to the 
scholarship allocation decision, the two participants in a pair can interact with each other.  
The rules for scholarship allocation:
• Each academic advisor will distribute 1000 Points among the 5 student applicants.
• Each student applicant may face three different outcomes: Full reward (1000 points), partial reward 
(200 points), and no reward (0 point).
• In addition, we ASSUME all the applicants are the same qualified.
• According to the college policy, all the applicants shall receive the same amount of award (partial 
award, 200 points)
• At the beginning of each round, the student will receive 200 points as initial endowment. The advisor 
does not have initial endowment.
Introduction to the STUDENTS:
If your role is the STUDENT, then you can imagine that you have applied five different scholarships. Meanwhile, 
you have the opportunity to contact with one of the academic advisors who are in charge of the scholarship 
allocation. The first decision you need to make, is whether or not to contact the academic advisor. For example 
(see the picture below): student3 have applied 5 different scholarships. In addition, she may transfer a certain 
amount of points (1-200) to the academic advisor who will allocate the rewards of scholarship C, in the hope 
that to earn the full reward (1000 points).
If you decide “do not contact the advisor”, then you have no other decisions to make in this round. Please wait 
for the scholarship allocation outcome.
If you decide to “contact the advisor”, then you will make your second decision: transfer a certain amount of 
Translated experimental instruction (familiar context as a sample)
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points to the advisor. You will specify an integer of the range from 1 to 200 points. After your transfer decision, 
please wait for the scholarship allocation outcome. When all the scholarships have been allocated, you will see 
the feedback on how much reward you received from each of the scholarships.
Introduction to the ACADEMIC ADVISOR:
If your role is the ADVISOR, you will allocate 1000 points among 5 student applicants. At the beginning of 
each round, one of the students may contact with you and transfer some points to you. Based on the student’s 
decision, you may see one of the two outcomes: (1) the student has contacted me, and have transferred some 
points to me; or (2) the student has decided not to contact me. 
If the student has contacted you, and has transferred some points to you, then you will make a selection between 
“I accept the transfer” and “I reject the transfer”. If you accept the transfer, then the amount of offered will be 
deducted from the student’s account and then added to your account. If you reject the offer, then both you and 
the student’s accounts will remain unchanged. If the student has decided not to contact you, then you will make 
the allocation decision directly (see examples below).
Next, you will allocate the 1000 points scholarship among the 5 students. Keep in mind that all the students are 
equally qualified. According to the college policy, you shall split the 1000 points, and allocate 200 points to each 
student. However, you can also violate the college policy, let the student in your pair earn all the 1000 points, 
and the other students earn nothing. In short, no matter what decision has been made by the student, you 
always need to make a selection between two options: (1) abide by the rule, let each student earns 200 points; 
or (2) violate the rule, let one student earns 1000 points, and the other students earn nothing. After that, the 
experiment will move to the next round.
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Experimental Procedure:
The game will be repeated 30 rounds. From round1 to round 15, you will play the game with a fixed partner. At 
the end of period 15, all the participants will be assigned to a new role, and then be paired with a new partner 
to play the game for another 15 periods.
How you will  be paid:
At the conclusion of the experiment, four rounds will be randomly selected, two from round1-round15, and the 
other two from round15 to round30. The randomly selected round will determine your earnings.
Punishment:
During the experiment, a pair of subjects will be identified as “foul” if any offer from the student was accepted by 
the advisor. By the end of the experiment, a lottery will be played out to decide whether to punish the subjects 
who are foul. With a probability of 1%, the punishment occurs: both participants’ earnings are cleared from 
their accounts. 
In the second part of the experiment, you will complete a short survey independently. 
Survey questions after the bribery game:
(1) When you were playing the STUDENT in the experiment, have you ever contacted the advisor? 
(2) Why or why not?
(3) When you were playing the ADVISOR in the experiment, have you ever violate the rule when allocating the 
scholarship? 
(4) Why or why not?
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Essay 3
The Premium for being a Nice Person: Agreeableness 
and Career Success Level in the Initial Career Stage
1. Introduction
    It has been widely accepted that people’s early career stage achievement and success dramatically 
affect their careers later in life. Previous studies have shown that employees who are very successful 
early on are at a distinct advantage in achieving later career success (Dreher & Bretz, 1991). In 
recent decades, more and more research has reported that individual personality traits play a vital 
role in determining labor market outcomes (Nyhus and Pons, 2005; Ng et al, 2005; Semykina and 
Linz, 2007; Rode et al, 2008; Judge et al, 2012.). Furthermore, many empirical studies have found that 
individual career achievement is jointly influenced by cognitive abilities, networking, and personality 
traits (Mueller and Plug, 2006). Most of these studies have placed emphasis on people’s mid-term 
career performance and outcome. We still know very little about how personality traits associate with 
early career achievement. Rode et al. (2008) found that factors that determine early career success 
differ from those related to achievement in one’s mid-term career. In this study, we explore the link 
between personality traits and early career success. In particular, we pose the question regarding how 
agreeableness as a personality trait affects people’s salary and career satisfaction level in the initial 
stages of one’s career.
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    Rich literature has found evidence that suggested that personality characteristics affect people’s 
income and career development decisions in systematical ways. For example, the literature suggested 
that agreeableness is negatively associated with people’s salary and promotions. These negative 
correlations have been repeatedly observed in many studies. (Ng et al., 2005; Nyhus and Pons, 2005; 
Mueller and Plug, 2006; Smykina and Linz, 2007; Rode et al., 2008; Judge et al., 2012). Simply put, 
personality psychologists define agreeableness as the tendency to be an altruistic and trustworthy 
person. People who score high on agreeableness are often considered to be team players, straightforward, 
and even self-sacrificing. These characteristics often negatively affect people’s earnings and promotion 
opportunities. Nyhus and Pons (2005) proposed that agreeable people are poorer wage negotiators 
and have an egalitarian attitude toward promotion opportunities and payment. Conversely, less-
agreeable persons are often considered to be assertive and aggressive, and such characteristics help 
them earn advantages in their careers. However, all of these studies examined how agreeableness 
affects the development of people’s career after several years. We think that the mechanism through 
which agreeableness affects the early-stage labor market outcome many differ from those traits that 
determine career development in later years. In the very beginning stages, there might be a premium 
for being a nice person. The first reason is that the advantage of being disagreeable might become 
more and more salient in later years, as it affects the way people interact with others. However, when 
an employer tries to make a hiring decision, she might prefer to have a colleague who is easy to get 
along with. Agreeable person may have gained some advantage during the interview progress. The 
second reason is that some graduates may begin with an internship at a company, then eventually be 
hired by the company as a full-time employee. During the internship experience, the agreeable person 
may entice her future colleagues to feel that she is a wonderful person to work with. Consequently, an 
agreeable person could be more likely to find a good job where she had an internship.
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    Another branch of literature looked at the effect of the interaction between personality traits and 
gender, as gender wage inequity is a common and persistent issue in many countries. This inequity 
often happens at the starting point of career path. This phenomenon is also observed in the Chinese 
Labor Market (Dong and Zhang, 2009; Shen and Deng, 2008; Zhang, Han, Liu, and Zhao, 2008). Judge 
et al. (2012) showed that agreeableness affects income differently based on the gender of the worker. 
Specifically, they found that the pay gap between agreeable and disagreeable males is significantly larger 
than the gap between agreeable and disagreeable females. In other words, males receive rewards for 
being disagreeable, but this benefit is minimal for females. The study by Judg et al. (2012) suggested 
the importance of looking at how gender and personality characteristics jointly affect earnings. In this 
paper, we propose that gender moderates the effect of agreeableness on career success. In Chinese 
culture, the social norm usually conceives females as agreeable and males as less agreeable. An 
individual whose personality is in conformance with his/her gender role might be appreciated within 
the labor market. Thus, we hypothesize that there is a premium for being an agreeable person, and 
females benefit from this premium more than males.
    According to economics literature, people’s labor market success is often solely defined by income. 
Higher income indicates better achievement. Yet we consider income to only reflect one part of the 
story. Psychologists and researchers in managerial science have pointed out that positive psychological 
outcomes are also important for one’s career development (Gutteridge, 1973; Judge et al., 1995; 
Seibert et al., 1999; Judge et al., 1999). In particular, when people enjoy their jobs, they can be more 
productive, more positive, and most importantly have better expectation for the future. Therefore, 
we consider people’s subjective rating on job-satisfaction level as another indicator of career success. 
In this study, we will measure career success using both starting salary and subjective rating on job-
satisfaction level.
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2. Data and Variable Measures
2.1. The Dataset
    This paper utilizes a unique data set generated by the Career Development Center (CDC) of JiangHan 
University in China. The data was collected from over 4192 Chinese young adults who recently 
graduated from a local college (JiangHan University). The survey was conducted in May 2015. This 
data set includes a rich set of usually labor-market and demographic variables. Most importantly, it 
includes information on the personality trait of agreeableness. 
    The survey was conducted at two different time points. The first part of the survey was conducted 
during the students’ senior year. It contained questions about the respondents’ expectations on their 
future job. For example, it measured the students’ expectations on their ideal occupation, working 
industry, and starting salary. The second part of the survey was conducted six months after the 
participants’ graduation. It contained questions about the respondents’ current working situation 
(current wage, current job satisfaction level, etc.). Unfortunately, some of the information and variables 
are missed due to administrative reasons. The most important information we do not gather includes 
the respondents’ GPA in school and their current working industry and occupation.
    A total of 5000 online-survey invitations were sent out, and of these, 4192 students returned the 
survey for a response rate of 83.84%. Among all of the respondents, 54,72% of them are female. The 
average income is 2431.87 RMB/month. According to a recent survey conducted by the Statistics 
department of Hubei Providence, the average starting salary for students in Hubei providence is 2653 
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RMB/month.  
2.2. Measurement
2.2.1. Agreeableness 
    From the psychology literature, the Big Five model has been the most commonly used method to 
describe personality. The Big Five model of personality suggests that there are five dimensions to 
personality: neuroticism, extroversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. 
The results from numerous studies have shown that measures for personality traits using the Big 
Five model have convincing reliability and validity. Since it is unusual to have a data set that contains 
variables that are of interest to both labor economists and personality psychologists, we have found 
few studies that incorporate personality traits into economics research. The personality survey we 
used in this study is a subset of the standard International Personality Item Pool (IPIP). It contains 
three questions regarding people’s agreeableness level. These questions are highly internally 
consistent (scale reliability coefficient = 0.8362). The mean value of this agreeableness measure is 
4.923 (compared with a mean value of 4.97 from the literature). In addition, we find that, in our sample, 
females have a higher average value (mean = 0.522) on agreeableness than males (mean = 0.457). This 
observation is consistent with the findings from the psychology literature (McCrase and Costa, 1987; 
Goldberg, 1999). 
 
2.2.2. Career Success
    In this paper, we use two variables as indicators of career success. The first variable is current 
salary level, which is the most commonly used measure of career success in economics literature. In 
the sample, the mean value of the current salary level is 2431.86 RMB per month. Since most of the 
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respondents in the sample graduated from college during summer 2015, the current salary level in 
the report is effectively the payment of the first job in their career. In addition, there is a difference 
between the current wages of males and females. In our sample, the average monthly income of females 
is 2377.45, which is significantly lower than the average monthly income (2503.10) of males (t test 
result p = 0.01). This observation is consistent with findings from past studies (Rawski and Zhang, 
1999; Gustafsson, 2000; Liu, Meng, and Zhang, 2000; chen and ge, 2012). Moreover, since part of the 
survey was conducted during the students’ senior year in college, we pose a question on their expected 
wage. The average expected monthly earnings for females is 3767.61 and is 3887.35 for males. There 
is no statistical difference between these two values (t-test result p =0.087). 
    The second career-success indicator is subjective job satisfaction level. The exact question read as 
follows: “How satisfied are you with your current job?” The respondent rated their responses on a 
6-point scale, with higher scores reflecting a higher satisfaction level. From our sample, the average 
score of the current job satisfaction level is 2.88 (s.d.=1.244). In terms of gender difference, we find 
that females indicate a higher job satisfaction level than males. The average job satisfaction levels for 
females and males are 2.94 and 2.81, respectively. These two values are statistically different from 
each other (t test result p = 0.0006). 
agreeableness
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Job Satisfaction
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3. Method
    To estimate the effect of agreeableness on early career success, we estimate two models. The first 
model is a usual semi-logarithmic model:
   (1) Ln(Current Wage)=AG .α+X.β+u
  
    Where Ln(Current Wage)  is the natural logarithm of monthly income, AG is the measurement for 
agreeableness, X is a row vector of individual characteristics, and u is the error term. In the vector 
of observed characteristics, the included variables are healthy condition, major in college, expected 
working occupation, and expected working industry.
Hypothesis 1: keeping other things equal, individuals with higher agreeableness receive higher starting 
salary than individuals with lower agreeableness. 
The second model concerns about people’s job satisfaction level. 
   (2) S=AG.α+X.β+w.δ+ u
Where S is the discrete measurement of job satisfaction level. Please keep in mind that higher score 
on S indicate the individual is more satisfied with her current job. Another important independent 
variable is whether the current job matches with the respondents’ interests. The respondent answered 
this question on a 6-point likert scale, where higher score means better match. In addition to the 
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agreeableness measurement and other individual characteristics, we also put the individual’s income 
on the right hand side (w), as it might be an important predictor of the job satisfaction level.
Hypothesis 2: keeping other things equal, individuals with higher agreeableness are more satisfied 
with their current job.
4. Results
    Table 1 summarized the correlations among the key variables. From table1, we learned that the wages 
people actually earned (current wage) is significantly related with their expected wages (r = 0.157, 
p<0.01). This observation indicates that most people have a reasonable expectation on their earnings. 
Moreover, current wage is also significantly related with gender (r=-0.039, p=0.021), indicating that 
female respondents earned less than males. This observation is also consistent with findings from the 
gender wage gap literature. In addition, current wage is also significantly related with agreeableness 
(r = 0.036, p=0.032). We also find that agreeableness is positively related with female gender, and 
this phenomenon have been consistently observed in past studies. However, we find no significant 
Table1. Correlation Between the Key Variables
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relationship between wages and job-satisfaction level.
    We start our regression by estimating the effect of agreeableness with self-reported healthy condition 
as the only control variable. Column (1) to (3) in table 2 reported the regression results for the total, 
Table2. Agreeableness Positively Affect Starting Salary for Women
Table3. Agreeableness has Marginal Positive Effect on Job Satisfation Level
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male and female samples. We then add the respondents’ college majors, expected working industries 
and expected working occupations as control variables. Results are summarized in column (4) to (6). 
According to table2, we learn that the effect of agreeableness is positive and statistically significant to 
female. This effect is robust to change of model specifications. However, we find no such effect for the 
male sample. 
        Our hypothesis 1 is true for the female sample, but not for the male sample. One reason agreeableness 
only has impact on women’s starting salary may be due to the gender stereotypes in the workplace. In 
Chinese culture, people often define female stereotype of being agreeable and humble. The employers 
(or potential employers) may appreciate individuals who conforming to this stereotype, especially 
during an internship period or an interview experience. Oppositely, male stereotype is often defined 
as less-agreeable and assertive. From our sample, the males are not rewarded of being agreeable.
    We then test the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction level using model (2). We start the 
analysis with wage, self-reported health condition, and interest match as the control variables. Results 
for the total, male and female samples are summarized in column (1) to (3) in table3. We then add 
in the respondents’ college majors, expected working industries and expected working occupations. 
Results are summarized in column (4) to (6). According to table3, we see that self-reported health 
condition has a positive effect on job satisfaction level. In addition, we observe that interest match 
has the strongest prediction power on job satisfaction level. This result makes intuitive sense to us, 
because one must enjoy her job much better when she feels that her interest and ability is match with 
the job. However, we only find agreeableness has an effect on the total sample in a model with fewer 
controls. This effect is not robust to changes of model specifications. When we add in majors, expected 
occupations, and expected working industry into the model, we find job-satisfaction level cannot be 
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explained by agreeableness.
5. Conclusion
    In this paper, we test whether the personality trait of agreeableness could be taken as a predictor of 
early career success. Past studies have investigated if agreeableness affects career success for mature 
managers and established employees. Few studies have looked at how it may influence new hired 
employees who are at the initial stage of career. 
    Researchers in managerial science have pointed out that career success should be decomposed 
into two dimensions: extrinsic success based on objective indicators and intrinsic success based on 
subjective indicators. In most past economics studies, career success was solely defined by income, 
which is an objective indicator. In this paper, we use two different variables to measure one’s career 
success. The first variable is monthly income, which is commonly used in economics studies. It could 
be seen as an extrinsic indicator of career success. The second variable is subjective job-satisfaction 
level, which could be taken as an intrinsic measure for career success. According to our data, these two 
measures are independent from each other. That is to say, higher income does not necessarily predict 
higher job-satisfaction level.
    We also find that agreeableness has a positive effect on the female respondents’ starting salary. 
This effect is highly robust to change in model specifications. From past studies, we learned that 
cognitive ability was positively related to income (Ng el al.,2005). Our result here suggests that non-
cognitive ability also plays a vital role in determining labor market outcome. In addition, we find that 
agreeableness positively related with subjective job-satisfaction level. However, this result is not 
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robust to changes in model specifications. When we add the respondents’ major as a control variable, 
the effect of agreeableness on job-satisfaction becomes negligible and not statistically significant. This 
result might suggest a self-sorted story when choosing a major. Further examination is required to 
explore this possibility.
    This study has several limitations. First of all, most of the variables in the dataset are self-reported 
measure. The respondents might have made some mistakes while answering those questions, no 
matter intentionally or unintentionally. Secondly, due to administrative reasons, some of the variables 
of interest are missed from our dataset. For example, we do not have the respondents’ current working 
industry and occupation. We will try to recover these variables when we re-survey the respondents. 
Thirdly, Since the data were collected from a local university in China, we are concerned about the 
generalizability of the results. Although the students in JiangHan University may represent their 
cohorts to some extent, we shall always be cautious to generalize these results to other populations. 
Finally, in our analysis we only have personality measure on the agreeableness dimension. Although 
such measure is reasonable given the results reported in the literature, our argument would be more 
convincing if we could have a complete personality measure on all the five dimensions. To achieve 
this goal, we plan to track and to resurvey the respondents for at least three years.  Availability of 
longitudinal data on individual’s working industry, career development, and personality traits would 
be helpful.
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